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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Petitioner,

Case No: 20170518-SC

vs.
TRACY SCOTT,
Defendant / Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
INTRODUCTION
Tracy Scott shot and killed his wife, Teresa. The only defense Tracy
presented was that his guilt should be mitigated by the fact that he acted “under
the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse”, which was not “substantially caused by [his] own conduct.”
UTAH CODE §76-5-205.5 (2013). In order to demonstrate this distress and its
source, Tracy intended to testify that in the days preceding the shooting, his wife
had threatened him. This threat would be used in conjunction with other evidence,
like that Teresa repeatedly removed her gun from the gun safe and that their
fighting had gotten worse than ever, with repeated confrontational behavior, to
show Tracy experienced extreme distress caused by Teresa’s statements and
conduct. As Tracy began to testify about that threat the prosecutor objected,
alleging Teresa’s statements were hearsay. The correct response, the obvious
response, was that the threat was not being offered to prove the truth of the matter
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asserted, but to prove the effect the threat had upon Tracy, to prove how he
received it, how it affected him. It was being offered to prove that Tracy’s distress
was due, at least in part, to having been threatened by Teresa. Tracy continued to
try to introduce the threat because it was the basis for his defense, but each time
he did the prosecutor objected, defense counsel failed to respond, and the trial
court excluded the testimony. Tracy was unable to present his defense, and counsel
was unable to argue that threat contributed to Tracy’s distress, that the threat
enhanced and amplified Teresa’s other conduct. On the other hand, the State was
able to argue there was nothing Teresa did to cause Tracy’s distress.
This Court has allowed the State to challenge the Court of Appeals’ decision
about whether it was deficient performance for counsel not to argue the threat
evidence was not hearsay. Making that argument should be very difficult for the
State. Reasonable counsel would not have failed to respond to the incorrect
hearsay objection. The most basic question at issue in hearsay is ‘what is the
purpose of the statement, why is it being offered?’ Any reasonable counsel would
have known that the only relevant purpose to introduce Teresa’s threat was to
prove the effect it had upon Tracy, and how it could have impacted his emotional
distress. Any reasonable counsel would have known it wasn’t hearsay because it
wasn’t being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. To fail to utilize the
basic rules of evidence was unreasonable and deficient.
This Court has also granted cert to consider the State’s argument that
counsel’s failure to introduce the threat evidence didn’t prejudice Tracy’s case. But
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again, this should be difficult fof the State. There can be little doubt that the threat
evidence was central to Tracy’s defense. The only question is whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that at least one juror would have found, by a
preponderance, that Tracy’s extreme emotional distress was not substantially
caused by his own conduct. Logic, as well as the record evidence, strongly suggests
that at least one juror would have believed Tracy’s actions, while not justifiable,
were mitigated by the totality of the circumstances, when the totality of the
circumstances include that threat. Because this Court’s confidence in the verdict
and the fairness of the trial should be undermined, trial counsel’s failure to respond
to the hearsay objection was prejudicial.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether trial counsel’s failure to use basic evidentiary rules to admit

a key piece of evidence for the defense constitutes deficient performance.
2.

Whether trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense

such that it undermines the Court’s confidence in the jury’s verdict.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“On certiorari, this court reviews the decision of the court of appeals for
correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law.” State v. Baker, 2010 UT
18, ¶7, 229 P.3d 650. “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first
time on appeal presents a question of law.” State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ¶16, 247 P.3d
344.
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OPINION BELOW
The Court of Appeals’ opinion to be reviewed is State v. Scott, 2017 UT App
74, __ P.3d __.1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of the Facts
Tracy and Teresa Scott began their marriage as “two peas in a pod.”
R.278:84. Within a few years, however, the marriage became “good and bad” with
instances of jealousy and fighting. R.278:86. According to Tracy, 65 to 70 percent
of the time they were fighting. R.278:86–87. During their fighting, Scott insulted
Teresa and used profanity. R.278:150. But, in terms of insults, threats, and
profanity, Teresa could and would “pour it out” right back at him. R.278:168.
The couple’s fighting prompted police response some “six to eight time,”
including one time in 2008 or 2009 when Scott was charged with domestic
violence. R.278:88, 90. To deal with their fighting and confrontations, the couple
started counseling with their local bishop and made attempts to improve the
relationship. R.278:91. For a time, things improved. Id. Then, in 2006, police were
called after the two began another fight that led to Tracy kicking Teresa. R.278:154.
At the time, Tracy was working for the Alpine School District as a school bus
mechanic. R.278:93. Teresa attended college, trying to “get into something that she
could comfortably do.” R.278:92. During this time, the two continued to fight

1

A copy of the Court of Appeals’ decision is attached to this brief as Addendum A.
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about finances, student loan debt, Teresa’s inability to find work, spending habits,
how to use tax refunds, the need to repair the family’s vehicles, what assets could
be sold to relive their financial burdens, and Teresa’s prescription drug costs.
R.278:94–102. In the weeks preceding Teresa’s death, the couple’s fighting “was a
lot, lot worse” than usual. R.278:107. It was “get in your face, yell, scream at each
other, spit flying…” kind of fighting. R.278:107; 278:160.
Two or three days before the shooting, Tracy called his brother Zane on the
phone. R.278:195. Tracy was “distraught,” “seemed worse,” and was “very
disturbed.” R.278:196. Tracy’s voice was shaking on the phone and he “seemed
over-concerned about what was going on.” Id.
On Friday, the day before the shooting, Tracy had the day off, so he went
“out back” to “tinker in the garage or tinker in the yard.” R.278:108. When the
phone rang in the garage, Tracy answered it. R.278:110. It was Teresa’s mother, so
he took the phone into the couple’s bedroom where he saw Teresa “off to the front
of the bed, sitting on a stool crouched down at the bed, in front of the bed crouched
down.’ R.278:110–11. Tracy leaned across the corner of the bed, tossed the phone
on the bed, and told Teresa it was her mother. R.278:112. As Tracy stood back up,
he noticed that the couple’s gun safe was pulled out from under the dresser where
it usually stayed, and was open. Id. He saw one pistol inside, but he did not see
Teresa’s gun there, a Beretta 9-millimeter. R.278:116–17.
Walking back out to the garage, Tracy thought about the missing pistol and
remembered “there was threat made” on Wednesday. R.278:112–13. Now, he
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thought, “the threat was serious.” Id. Tracy believed Teresa was going to use the
missing gun, the 9-millimeter Beretta, to do him some harm. R.278:117. Tracy was
nervous, continued to stew and worry about it, and felt “scared to death.” Id.2
Tracy did not sleep well that night, and woke up feeling stressed and scared.
R.278:121. Saturday morning Tracy went to a haircut appointment and then to
work to put tires on the family’s car. R.278:121–22. Later that day, Tracy arranged
to pick up some manure for the garden, but when he tried to back the trailer into
the backyard, it “kept rubbing the fence.” R.278:125. That caused “another
argument” in front of the children. Id. Their oldest son, Thayne, remembered the
fighting that day “was more aggressive than regular fights.” R.279:98. It was more
contentious than normal. R.278:103.
When Tracy went into the house to use the bathroom, he saw “the [gun] safe
was pulled out from… underneath the dresser—open with one pistol in it.”
R.278:126–27. Earlier, Tracy had seen the safe “closed and shoved back under the
dresser,” but now it was open again, and the Beretta was missing. R.278:163. Like
the day before, Teresa was sitting next to the bed. R.278:127. Having seen the gun
taken from the safe again, Tracy decided that using the bathroom inside the home
was the “last of [his] problems,” so he went outside and “went to the bathroom in
a ditch out back in the corner.” Id. He did not “dare go back in the house,” and

Trial counsel asked, “who threatened who?”, but before Tracy could answer, the
prosecutor objected again and Tracy did not testify who had threatened him.
R.278:113.
2
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instead, stayed out in the garage. Id.
Several times, while Tracy was in the garage, he noticed “Teresa would be
leaning out the door and just staring at [him] and so [he] just was freaking out.”
R.278:128. Scared to death because he thought she had a gun, Tracy “started to wig
out, just freak out.” R.278:129. Eventually, he decided he was “going to go in there
and confront this.” Id. When he entered the house, he could hear Teresa on the
phone and thought she was talking to her mother. R.278:130. Tracy went into the
kitchen and took a drink from out of the refrigerator. R.278:131. Then, he heard
Teresa’s voice yelling at him. Id.
At that moment, Tracy “snapped,” “saw red,” and “went storming in there.”
Id. Teresa was laying on the bed, point her cell phone at Tracy, as if she was taking
a picture or video of him. R.278:164. Tracy “looked at her…looked at the cell…[and]
looked down at the gun safe.” R.278:131. The “only gun there was the black one,”
the Beretta was missing again. Id.
Tracy “reached down and grabbed the gun” and cocked it on the way up. Id.
He stood there “with the gun in [his] hand pointed at Teresa.” He noticed his hand
was shaking, “[a]nd then, boom.” Id. Tracy stared at Teresa, but she just sat there
not moving. Id. Then, Tracy started walking away when “all of the sudden she just
started to lean and was dead.” Id. Tracy jumped, and the gun went off again.
R.278:132. Cautiously, Tracy walked around the end of the bed to the other side
and looked down. Id. There, “right off the side” of the bed on the carpet, was the 9millimeter Beretta, fully loaded with a round in the chamber. R.278:163; 277:120.
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B. Summary of the Proceedings
Several times during his testimony, defense counsel asked questions related
to the circumstances of a particular threat Teresa made to Tracy. The prosecutor
objected to this testimony, arguing that it would be hearsay. R.278:98, 110, 113.
The trial court called a sidebar and told defense counsel, “There’s no way that
you’re going to dance around and get a threat without [it] being hearsay. The only
two people in the room is this, so get away from this….” R.291:113.
Following the sidebar, defense counsel resumed questioning Tracy. Again,
defense counsel asked a question related to the details of the threat made to Tracy.
Id. The prosecutor objected again, and the court called another sidebar. The court
warned defense counsel, “if we get a feel within one question, I’m just going to
make you move onto a new line of testimony…” Id. Defense counsel never argued,
at either sidebar, that the testimony he sought to introduce was not hearsay, and
thus admissible. R.278:113–14. In fact, defense counsel never really responded at
all to the claim that Teresa’s statements were hearsay. The specific words of the
threat were never introduced or proffered during trial, and subsequently, are not
part of this record on appeal.3
During deliberation, the jury sent several written communications to the
court. One note characterized the jurors as “at an absolute impasse. 6-2.” R.182;

3 Scott filed a

23B motion to remand to the Utah Court of Appeals with attachments
demonstrating what the content of the threat was. The Court of Appeals did not
rule on that motion. A copy of that motion, with its attachments, is attached to this
brief as Addendum B.
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280:78. The note then stated, “Two feel that ‘substantially caused’ needs to be the
‘majority of the time’ See 13b.” Id. Referring to the requirements of special
mitigation, the jury sent another note asking, “What is the legal definition of
‘substantially caused?’” R.181, see Utah Code §76-5-205.5(3)(b).4
The court declined to define the term “substantially caused” and concluded
that the instructions already given were proper. R.280:85–86. It found no
difference “between an impasse and an absolute impasse.” R.280:86. According to
the court, “absolutely” only meant that the jury had “really tried.” Id. The court
then issued an Allen-type dynamite instruction, over defense counsel’s objection
and request for mistrial, urging the jury to continue deliberations “in an effort to
agree upon a verdict.” R.180; 280:94.5
After having receive the dynamite instruction, the jury continued
deliberations “from 6:06 to 8:19,” or another two hours and 13 minutes. R.280:95.
After deliberations, it returned a verdict of guilty of murder and did not find special
mitigation under the influence of extreme emotional distress. R.179; 280:96. The
court sentenced Tracy to serve 15 years to life in prison. R.236; 182:12–13.
Scott filed a timely notice of appeal. R.238. The Court of Appeals issued its

Although the record is not precisely clear when these two notes were sent from
the jury, and whether they were sent at the same time, the context of the record
makes clear that the court and the parties understood the jury’s impasse was tied
to the question of special mitigation and about the meaning of “substantially
caused.” The jury questions (R.181-82) are attached to this brief as Addendum C.
5 A copy of the trial court’s supplemental instruction (R.180) is attached to this
brief as Addendum D.
4
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opinion reversing Scott’s conviction and ordering a new trial on May 4, 2017.
C. Decision of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, Scott raised two issues: 1) Whether the trial court erred in giving
a verdict-urging instruction when the jury was at an absolute impasse; and 2)
Whether trial counsel provided effective assistance. The Court of Appeals
addressed only the second issue in its opinion. Scott also filed a motion for remand
pursuant to Rule 23B to produce evidence of ineffectiveness, including the content
of the threat evidence. The Court of Appeals did not rule on that motion.
In support of his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Scott argued that
when the State objected to testimony regarding Teresa’s threat, defense counsel
did not attempt to argue the threat was admissible non-hearsay. State v. Scott,
2017 UT App 74, ¶19, ___ P.3d ___. The State, defense, and Court of Appeals all
agreed that the threat was not hearsay and should have been admitted. Scott, ¶22.
“[I]f defense counsel had demonstrated this through proper argument,” the Court
of Appeals wrote, “the [trial] court would have allowed Scott to testify about it.” Id.
at 23. “[D]efense counsel failed to correctly use the rules of evidence to support
Scott’s defense”. Id. at ¶25. This failure, the Court concluded, “was unreasonable,
especially in light of Scott’s trial strategy, which was to show that his distress
originated outside his own behavior… a reasonable attorney would have used the
rules of evidence to explain to the court why the threat was admissible.” Id. at ¶25.
The court concluded that counsel’s failure to utilize the rules of evidence “did not
merely ‘deviate from best practices or most common custom’—it amounted to
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deficient performance.” Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105
(2011)).
The State claimed counsel’s performance “was not deficient because ‘counsel
had a sound strategic reason not to seek to admit the specific words of Teresa’s
alleged threat.’” Id. at ¶26. According to the State, “an ‘imaginary threat’ could have
had a greater impact on the jury than hearing the actual words.” Id. at ¶26. The
Court of Appeals quickly dismissed this argument: “the negative repercussions of
omitting the content of the threat were greater than the possible benefits;
admitting its contents would only have strengthened Scott’s defense.” Id. at ¶27.
The court characterized the threat as “central to a defense that focused on trying
to show that Scott’s conduct originated from distress caused by a source other than
his own conduct, there was no strategic reason for counsel not to argue that the
threat was admissible.” Id. at ¶28. Ultimately, the court determined that Scott had
med his burden showing his defense counsel’s performance was deficient. Id.
The Court of Appeals then turned its attention to the question of whether
defense counsel’s deficient performance caused prejudice. While the State
maintained “there [was] no reasonable likelihood the outcome of the trial would
have been different if the jury had heard the specific words of Teresa’s threat,” the
Court of Appeals found otherwise. Id. at ¶32.
Scott testified that “there was a threat made,” and had even pointed to the
fact that Teresa’s gun missing from its safe made him think “the threat was
serious.” Id. at ¶33. However, when Scott tried to explain the details of the threat,
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tried to explain why the threat was connected to the missing gun, the State
objected, the Court sustained the objection, and defense counsel did not “inquire
into it again and did not argue, or even imply, that the threat played a role in special
mitigation.” Id. At closing argument, the Court of Appeals found that the
prosecution asked the jury “what reasonable basis does [Scott] have to make [the]
claim that simply the absence of that gun from the safe creates extreme emotional
distress[?].” Id. (alteration in original). “For these reasons,” the Court ruled, “we
are persuaded that testimony of the specific threat and its effect on Scott would
have given the jury more evidence on the very point that was in dispute.” Id. That
probability was enough to undermine the Court’s confidence in the outcome of the
trial. Id. At ¶34. The Court of Appeals then concluded that Scott had received
ineffective assistance of counsel and ordered his conviction reversed and
remanded for a new trial. Id. at ¶35.
Judge Voros and Judge Christiansen wrote concurring opinions, in which
both acknowledged that “Scott was the usual aggressor” in the relationship. Id. at
¶37, ¶46. Considering the lengthy accounts of arguments, fights, domestic violence
reports, and even a temporary restraining order, both Judge Voros and Judge
Christiansen questions whether Scott should have had access to the extreme
emotional distress defense, questioned whether the law should not be changed. Id.
at ¶39–40, ¶44. Yet, both judges also agreed that the threatening statement made
to Scott “fell outside the definition of hearsay” and “Competent defense counsel
should have known enough to correctly argue that the rules of evidence would
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allow the jury to hear this testimony.” Id. at ¶43, ¶36. Both judges joined in the
opinion finding counsel’s error in responding to the hearsay objection prejudiced
Scott’s defense.
On July 5, 2017, the State filed its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Scott filed
his Response on August 3, 2017. A reply from the State was filed on August 22,
2017. This Court granted the State’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on September
20, 2017.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals found trial counsel’s performance deficient because he
failed to use the rules of evidence to admit the most crucial piece of evidence for
the defense. In an attempt to undermine that decision the State tries to reframe
the question, and rather than focusing on the actual issue (the hearsay objection
and counsel’s failure to respond) the State tries to imagine a different case where
the defense does not intend to admit the threat evidence. The State wants this
Court to focus on this imaginary case and the conceivable strategies that could play
a role there. But this Court should not follow the State’s lead. Because the defense
in this case was trying to admit evidence that was admissible non-hearsay, it was
objectively unreasonable, and certainly not strategic, for trial counsel not to
respond to the objection. Trial counsel should have known what evidentiary
argument to make to overcome the State’s objection. Instead, counsel failed to
make any argument in support of admitting the evidence. Such conduct is
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objectively unreasonable and, under Strickland’s test, constitutes deficient
performance.
By performing in a way no other competent attorney would have performed,
the jury found that Scott substantially caused his extreme emotional distress.
However, had trial counsel used the rules of evidence to admit the defense’s key
piece of evidence, the jury would have learned that Teresa had been a major source
of Tracy’s distress. The State disagrees with this analysis, arguing the threat played
only a minor role in the defense. Considering the jury had already reached an
absolute impasse during initial deliberations, though, the State’s argument
underestimates how necessary testimony of the threat was to the defense. With it,
the jury likely would have remained at an impasse, or more jurors would have
believed Tracy did not substantially cause his own distress. Therefore, but for
defense counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the
trial’s outcome would have been different. For these reasons, Scott respectfully
asks this Court to affirm the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
ARGUMENT
I. FOLLOWING THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN STRICKLAND v.
WASHINGTON, THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY FOUND
TRIAL COUNSEL’S PERFORMANCE DEFICIENT
This Court has “classified the burden that defendants bear when asserting
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as a ‘heavy’ one.” State v. Larrabee, 2013
UT 70, ¶18, 321 P.3d 1136. That is because a defendant must prove both of the
following: 1) that counsel’s performance was so deficient as to fall below an
- 14 -

objective standard of reasonableness and 2) that but for counsel’s deficient
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would
have been different. Id. (citing State v. Nelson–Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ¶29, 94
P.3d 186). Yet, the Sixth Amendment recognizes defense counsel’s role to “ensure
that the trial is fair.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). “For
that reason, the Court has recognized that the right to counsel is the right to
effective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)). “The benchmark for
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so
undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result.” Id.
This Court granted the State’s Writ of Certiorari to determine whether
Scott’s trial counsel’s failure with respect to the erroneous hearsay objection fell
below the objectively reasonable standard set forth in Strickland. The State’s brief
goes to great lengths to argue that the Court of Appeals failed to use Strickland’s
standard in analyzing defense counsel’s performance. As an initial, procedural
matter, Scott asserts that this Court limited the issues on appeal to arguments over
whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the Strickland standard, not
whether it used the appropriate standard.
The Court of Appeal’s opinion unequivocally found defense counsel’s
performance objectively unreasonable, based on Strickland’s requirements.
Specifically, the court found that defense counsel had failed to make a basic
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evidentiary argument to overcome a hearsay objection. In turn, this failure
prevented counsel from admitting a key piece of evidence necessary for Scott’s
mitigating defense of extreme emotional distress. That evidence was a threat, made
by Scott’s wife Teresa, to Scott. Failure to “correctly use the rules of evidence” to
admit this testimony, the court concluded, constituted performance below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Scott, ¶25.
Despite this conclusion, the State argues that because the record did not
include the details of Teresa’s threat, the Court of Appeals could not reach the
conclusion that counsel performed deficiently. For purposes of the Strickland
deficiency prong, however, the State places more weight than necessary on the
content of the threat. As admissible, non-hearsay testimony, counsel should have
easily overcome the State’s hearsay objection at trial and admitted this crucial
piece of evidence. Although the State argues that because the content of the threat
is not in the record Scott cannot prove deficiency, the State confuses deficiency for
prejudice.
A. The Supreme Court’s Restatement of the Issues in this Appeal
Do Not Give Leave for Arguments Over the Standard Used in the
Lower Court’s Opinion
The Court granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and used the following
language to restate the issues on appeal: “1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
concluding Respondent’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
argue testimony about a threat was not hearsay. 2. Whether the Court of Appeals
erred in concluding Respondent was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to assert that
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testimony about a threat was not hearsay.” See Order Granting State’s Petition for
Writ of Certiorari. The Court’s restatement of these issues indicates its intent to
hear arguments about the correctness of the lower court’s conclusions, not whether
the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard in making those conclusions.
More specifically, the Court’s issue restatement invites arguments on the
ineffectiveness claim within the context of the hearsay issue and counsel’s failure
to overcome the hearsay. Indeed, the Court’s language seems to discourage
arguments about whether the contested evidence conforms to a particular trial
theory. Had the Court wished to consider the lower courts construction and
application of the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, its restatement of
the issues would more clearly represent its desire to do so.
Instead, the Court expressly limited the parties’ arguments to whether the
lower court reached the correct conclusion about the hearsay issue. Nonetheless,
the State argued in its brief that the Court of Appeals misconstrued the Strickland
standard in its analysis. See Brief of Petitioner (hereinafter “Pet. Bf.”), pgs. 27, 33,
36, & 38. “The court of appeals began and ended its deficient performance analysis
with assessing whether counsel had a sound trial strategy.” Id. at 27. This analysis,
the State criticized, was incorrect. Id.
The State’s criticism is misplaced and entirely overlooks the lower court’s
discussion of Strickland’s standard, the “objective standard of reasonableness.”
Strickland, 446 U.S. at 688. Indeed, the court, from the outset of its opinion, noted,
“To show deficient performance under Strickland, Scott must demonstrate that
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counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’” Scott,
2017 UT 74, ¶20 (quoting Strickland, 446 U.S. at 688). The court continued its
discussion of the “objective standard of reasonableness” when it analyzed defense
counsel’s inability to correctly argue the rules of evidence, comparing counsel’s
failure to what a “reasonable attorney” would have done in light of Scott’s trial
strategy. Id. at ¶25. Such an attorney “would have used the rules of evidence to
explain to the court why [Teresa’s threat] was admissible.” Id. “Counsel’s lack of
argument,” the Court of Appeals concluded, “did not merely ‘deviate[] from best
practices or most common custom—it amounted to deficient performance.” Id.
(quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011)).
The State believes the court rested its conclusion solely upon a
determination that counsel’s actions did not constitute “sound trial strategy.” Pet.
Bf., pg. 27. Yet, the State fails to acknowledge that the lower court’s discussion of
trial strategy was merely a response to the State’s argument that “counsel had a
sound strategic reason not to seek to admit the specific words of Teresa’s alleged
threat.” Scott, ¶26. Quickly disposing with that argument, the court found that “the
threat’s actual content could have connected it to various aspects of Scott’s
testimony…and would have established the foundation for testimony about Scott’s
reaction to seeing the empty gun safe.” Id. at ¶27. Thus, according to the court,
choosing not to admit the threat “could not have been sound trial strategy.” Id. By
removing the actual wording of the court’s opinion, and by taking portions of that
opinion out of context, the State seeks for this Court to clarify that the correct
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standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is whether an attorney’s performance
was objectively unreasonable. Because the Court of Appeals conducted that exact
analysis, albeit not to the State’s preferred outcome, there is no reason to suspect
the court erred in either its construction or application of the Strickland standard.
This Court should not entertain the State’s attempt to redraw the lines for
Strickland ineffectiveness because the Court of Appeals’ opinion clearly follows the
standards set forth there and followed by Utah Courts for decades.
B. Using the Strickland Standard, the Court of Appeals Correctly
Found Trial Counsel’s Performance Deficient
It is uncontested that the threat Teresa made should have been admitted at
trial as non-hearsay statements crucial to establishing Scott’s state of mind at the
time of the shooting. Despite this fact, the State maintains that defense counsel
pursued a reasonable, strategic decision to not admit evidence that ought to have
been admitted. It reasons that the evidence was unnecessary, given the volume of
other evidence in the larger evidentiary picture. As such, the State believes there
was no strategic value in attempting to admit the threat. It concludes that this trial
strategy, abandoning the threat and using the other available evidence at trial to
prove Scott’s extreme emotional distress defense, precludes a finding that defense
counsel performed deficiently. The State’s arguments, however fail for the
following reasons. First, because the evidence was admissible non-hearsay, there
was no reasonable, strategic decision not to admit the evidence. Second, because
the evidence should have been admitted, defense counsel should have known what
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evidentiary argument to make to admit the evidence. Third, by failing to make any
evidentiary argument in support of admitting the evidence at all, defense counsel
performed in a way no other competent attorney would have done.
1. There was no strategic reason to not admit Teresa’s threat
It is well-established that in reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, courts must “judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on
the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. However, the Strickland standard reinforces the
strong presumption that, “under the circumstances, the challenged action might
be considered sound trial strategy.” Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, ¶19, 165 P.3d
1195 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Therefore, to satisfy Strickland’s first
prong, a “defendant must overcome the strong presumption that [his] trial counsel
rendered adequate assistance…by persuading the court that there was no
conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions.” State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶6, 89
P.3d 162 (quoting Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (1998); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]o rebut the presumption of sound
strategy, a defendant must ‘persaud[e] the court that there was no conceivable
tactical basis for counsel’s actions.’” Id.
The State has never admitted that trial counsel erred by not offering any
argument to support the admission of Teresa’s threat. Instead, the State asserts
that defense counsel’s actions “appear designed to further a reasonable trial
strategy….” Pet. Bf., pg. 30. When counsel drew an objection to testimony about
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Teresa’s threat during trial, the State assumes counsel had acted under the belief
that “reasonably concluded he need not respond to the prosecutor’s hearsay
objection by arguing that the words were nonhearsay.” Id. at 36–37. In other
words, according to the State, it was objectively reasonable for defense counsel to
immediately abandon his perfectly legitimate line of questioning that could have
continued with Tracy’s testimony detailing Teresa’s threat when the State
erroneously objected because counsel could have believed the testimony wasn’t
“necessary”. It is as if the State believes, because there was other evidence of
Tracy’s distress, even though the threat testimony was admissible and Tracy was
there ready to present it, because counsel would have had to actually respond to
the objection by saying “it’s not hearsay” it was objectively reasonable to simply
give up and limit the defense to the other evidence of distress.
The State supports this contention for two reasons: 1) “Defense counsel
could have reasonably concluded… he was not likely to succeed in getting the words
of the threat admitted”; and 2) “a reasonable attorney could conclude that he
already had more than enough to add the threat piece to the larger extreme
emotional disturbance puzzle.” Id. at 37. These arguments to the Court suggest, as
it did to the Court of Appeals below, that defense counsel, either before or during
trial, decided he did not want the contents of the threat admitted. Even if that were
the case, though the record strongly suggests otherwise, deciding not to admit this
threat would itself constitute objectively unreasonable performance. No
competent attorney would decide not to admit the defense’s most crucial piece of
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evidence. It seems, then, that the State’s understanding of counsel’s trial strategy
is at odds with the facts of this case.
This is not a case where, after the fact, the defendant points to some evidence
that was never discussed at trial and blames his attorney for not presenting it, but
that is the way the State wants the Court to think of it. Instead, this is a case where
the evidence was gathered, it was prepared, it was loaded and ready to admit. It
was on the tip of the witness’s tongue. The record is clear that defense counsel
made not one, but two attempts to get Teresa’s threat in. R.278:113–14. There can
be no doubt, defense counsel was attempting to admit the evidence, contrary to the
State’s belief. How then can the State argue it is possible “to conceive of a
reasonable tactical basis for trial counsel’s actions” when the facts so blatantly
contradict the State’s belief? Pet. Bf., pg. 29.
Perhaps the State believes that, prior to trial, defense counsel determined
“he was not likely to succeed in getting the words of the threat admitted,” but
nonetheless, endeavored to try anyway. Id. Under this theory, defense counsel
would have acted under a pre-determined assumption that the evidence would be
inadmissible, but perhaps the State would not object. If that were true, though the
record seems to contradict this scenario, counsel’s performance would still be
deficient, not because of any strategic decision, but because counsel’s actions
plainly illustrate his lack of basic evidentiary knowledge, because the evidence
plainly was admissible. A pre-trial determination that a non-hearsay threat was
actually inadmissible evidence, would be construed as deficient performance,
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simply because no competent attorney would reach the conclusion the State
suggests defense counsel may have reached.
Or perhaps the State is suggesting that, prior to trial, counsel knew the threat
evidence was admissible but decided he did not actually want to admit the threat,
only to have the jury see him try to admit it and fail. Under this scenario counsel
would have had to correctly predict both that counsel for the State would
incorrectly object to the threat evidence, and the trial court would incorrectly
exclude it. To be correct about that set of errors borders on prophetic, and in
reality, is not reasonable strategic purpose.
Another possible scenario, the one appellate counsel believes the State most
likely endorses, is that counsel intended to introduce the hearsay evidence but,
after the warning from the judge, decided not to continue attempting to admit it.
See Pet. Br., pg. 37. In this scenario, it is unclear whether counsel knows the rules
on hearsay, but assuming he does, his actions seem very strange. The State
characterizes counsel’s decision not to continue seeking to admit the threat
evidence as reasonable following the “judge’s strong admonition against inquiring
into the specific words of the threat”. Pet. Br., pg. 37. But what about the first time
the objection was raised? What about prior to the strong admonition? What about,
immediately following the first hearsay objection? Why wouldn’t counsel properly
respond then? Under this scenario, reasonable counsel would correctly respond to
the hearsay objection.
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On this point, the State’s case fails. The underlying question here is not, as
the State contends, about why some other attorney might conclude it was
reasonable trial strategy to not admit the evidence. Rather, the question is whether
counsel’s failure to respond to a hearsay objection was objectively reasonable. As
explained above, there was “no conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions.”
Clark, at ¶6. To conclude otherwise would be illogical under the facts presented in
this appeal and simplicity of the solution. But, counsel’s performance was not only
deficient for strategic reasons; counsel did what no other competent attorney
would have done, counsel failed to make any argument over the prosecutor’s
erroneous objection, even where the rules of evidence provide a perfectly suited
response... this was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. See UT.R.EVID. 801(c). No reasonable attorney would fail to use
the rules of evidence to admit this testimony.
2. Defense counsel should have overcome the hearsay objection
Since Teresa’s threat was admissible, it follows that defense counsel should
have overcome the prosecutor’s hearsay objection by making a simple evidentiary
argument. The State insists there is a reasonable alternative for defense counsel’s
actual actions. And reviewing courts should affirmatively entertain the range of
possible ‘reasons [defense] counsel may have had for proceeding as they did.”
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 196 (2011). But, the threshold question under
Strickland “is whether a reasonable, competent attorney could have chosen the
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strategy that was employed in the real-time context of trial.” State v. Barela, 2015
UT 22, ¶21, 349 P.3d 676 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
From the State’s perspective, the Court of Appeals was wrong because it did
not force Scott to prove that no reasonable attorney would have stayed silent when
the State incorrectly made the hearsay objection. Instead, according to the State,
the Court of Appeals found counsel deficient merely because it found “counsel
could have successfully made an argument” and didn’t. Pet. Br., pg. 40. The State
wants this Court to consider the wide range of options that were open to counsel
when the hearsay objection came in, and claims that there were other legitimate,
reasonable, responses, including doing nothing. Id., at 40-41. The State believes
the Court of Appeals’ decision was too hasty because it did not consider that
counsel was “permitted to choose a strategy within the wide ‘range of legitimate
decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.’” Id., at 41
(quoting State v. Met, 2016 UT 51, ¶113).
What is odd about the State’s argument is that while it presumes there was
this wide range of reasonable options available to counsel when the objection came
in, the State does not actually present any conceivable reasonable alternatives. The
State simply criticizes the Court of Appeals and asks this Court to reverse because
the court below did not consider whether it was reasonable to “conclude[] that
getting the specific wording of Teresa’s threat was not so necessary to the defense
that it was worth pressing the issue further.” Pet. Br., pg. 37 (emphasis added).
This proposed strategy, to not respond to the objection for fear that it would upset
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the trial judge, is new (the State only argued the objection was omitted because
counsel “concluded that he was better off without the specific wording of Teresa’s
threat” its brief to the Court of Appeals, page 33-34). But there can be little doubt
that, had it been presented as a conceivable strategy, it would have been rejected
as well. Nothing about the record suggests Judge Mortenson was not permitting
responses to objections, or that if counsel had asserted the evidence was not
hearsay that the court would have held it against Scott or taken revenge in some
way. One cannot reasonably argue that properly responding to the hearsay
objection in this context would have been met with anger or retribution from the
judge. And because counsel could not have reasonably feared it would, no
reasonable attorney would find failing to respond would be a reasonable strategic
response.
The Court of Appeals did entertain the State’s purported strategic reason for
not responding to the hearsay objection below and found the proposed strategy did
not constitute sound trial strategy. Scott, ¶¶25–27. The State argued that an
“‘imaginary threat’ could have had a greater impact on the jury than hearing the
actual words.” Scott, ¶26. In order to respond to this proposal, first, the Court of
Appeals looked at the case in context, which was that the defense strategy was to
“show that [Tracy’s] distress originated outside his own behavior.” Id. at ¶25. Scott,
who had the constitutional right to testify, to tell his side of the story, was there on
the witness stand trying to explain why he was so worried about that gun. Counsel’s
failure to respond to the erroneous objection occurred in this context. This Court
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should start with the same context in mind. The Court of Appeals related the threat
evidence to the rest of the evidence presented, “including Teresa’s threatening
behavior in other contexts”, as well as counsel’s failure to refer to an imaginary
threat in closing. Id. at ¶27. If counsel had wanted the jury to conjure up something
worse and connect that imaginary threat to Tracy’s distress, counsel would have at
least mentioned it in closing, but he didn’t. Instead, counsel steered clear of the
threat entirely after the judge ruled it was inadmissible hearsay.
For example, on Friday, the day before the shooting, Scott testified that he
first noticed Teresa’s gun was missing from the couple’s safe. R.278:112. This
caused him to think back to the Wednesday before, when he and Teresa had been
in a “big fight,” Teresa had accused Scott of having an affair, and a threat had been
made. R.278:113. But before he could testify about the details of the threat, the
prosecutor objected on hearsay grounds. R.278:113. After a brief sidebar, defense
counsel again inquired into Scott’s thoughts about the missing gun, to which Scott
replied, “I was thinking that the threat that I had received the day before…That she
was going to—she was,” and another objection was raised. R.278:113–114. The
hearsay objection was not responded to and was sustained, so the questioning
moved on. R.278:114. Defense counsel then asked Scott, “were you worried that
Teresa was going to use that gun to do some harm to you?” R.278:117. Scott
responded, “Yes.” Id.
Then, on the day of the shooting, Scott testified that while working in the
garage he decided to go inside to use the bathroom. R.278:126. Once inside, he saw
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Teresa in the corner of their bedroom, and noticed Teresa’s gun missing from the
safe again. R.278:127. Scott panicked, and refused to stay inside any longer.
R.278.:127). He went back to the garage and moments later noticed Teresa leaning
out the door, “just staring at [him]….” R.278:128. Scott contemplated calling the
cops, but decided not to when Teresa went back inside. R.278:128. Scott went back
to work, but a few moments later Teresa came back into the garage and began
staring at him again before going back into the house. R.278:129. Scott testified
that he “was scared to death” during this episode, and when he heard Teresa yelling
at him from inside, he “snapped.” R.278:131. Scott “went storming” into the
bedroom, saw Teresa on the bed, and looked down to see her gun was still missing
from the safe. R.278:131. That is when Scott reached down, grabbed his own gun
out of the safe, and shot Teresa. R.278:131.
In light of this testimony, defense counsel could not conclude that “sound
trial strategy” excused his failure to present any arguments in favor of admitting
the contents of Teresa’s threat. Sound trial strategy could not be to hope the jury
would remember the fact that Tracy had testified there had been a threat and never
mention it again. The threat testimony was the linchpin of the defense, it was
crucial to understand how the threat connected to the rest of Tracy’s testimony,
and because this evidence was perfectly admissible, counsel should have overcome
the hearsay objection.
Nonetheless, the State contends, “Merely because counsel could have
successfully made an argument, and that doing so may have supported the
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defendant’s defense, is never enough to prove deficient performance under
Strickland.” Pet. Bf., pg. 40.
While there is some truth to this contention, since this Court has not
interpreted Strickland’s test to permit a per se deficient performance, Scott is not
seeking a finding of per se deficiency here. See Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, ¶31, 194
P.3d 913 (refusing to make a per se deficient finding for counsel’s failure to
challenge five jurors for cause, or object to the prosecutor’s opening statement);
but see United State v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984)
(recognizing some circumstances where ineffective assistance of counsel is
presumed: 1) complete denial of counsel; 2) defense counsel fails to subject the
State’s case to any “meaningful adversarial testing”; and 3) when it is unlikely that
any attorney could prove effective assistance under the circumstances). Instead,
Scott asks the Court to do just as the Court of Appeals has done, to find that, under
the circumstances, counsel’s failure to respond to the objection was unreasonable.
No attorney is perfect, and Strickland does not require flawless
representation. But Strickland does require counsel to perform objectively
reasonably. And when no other competent attorney would fail to make a basic
evidentiary argument to introduce clearly admissible evidence, evidence the
defense clearly intends to introduce, it cannot be said that such action is objectively
reasonable. Despite the State’s claim that “[t]here are countless ways to provide
effective assistance in any given case,” (See Pet. Br., pg. 41 (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689) in this case there was only one way to present the defense counsel
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sought to raise, extreme emotional distress caused by Teresa’s conduct, and
counsel failed to make the one simple evidentiary argument necessary to present
that defense.
A similar situation arose in State v. Millett, where a defendant sought postconviction relief by claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. 2015 UT App 187,
¶7, 356 P.3d 700. There, the defendant asserted that he did not receive proper
Miranda warnings before an interrogation by police and defense counsel failed to
exclude his involuntary confession on that basis. Id. at ¶8. The Court of Appeals
agreed, finding defense counsel’s actions “outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance.” Id. at ¶18. Nonetheless, the State presented arguments that
defense counsel had “a clear strategic reason to forgo a motion to suppress,”
claiming the defendant would have been forced to testify at trial to support his
defense of consent. Id. at ¶16. According to the State, to avoid the risk of crossexamination, defense counsel made a tactical decision not to suppress the
defendant’s confession. Id. Unconvinced by the State’s assertions, the court found
that trial counsel actually had made an attempt to exclude the confession under
the rules of evidence, rather than under a Miranda argument. Id. at ¶17. However,
by failing to argue the confession was involuntary under Miranda, defense counsel
was unsuccessful in excluding the evidence and rendered ineffective assistance. Id.
As it has done in this case, the State argued in Millett, in spite of the record
evidence that showed otherwise, that counsel, for strategic reasons, didn’t really
want to present the defense later argued on appeal. The State wanted the court to
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ignore the record evidence that showed counsel was trying, albeit impotently, to
exclude his confession, and pretend exclusion was never part of the plan. But the
Court of Appeals there looked to the record, found evidence that counsel actually
tried to exclude the evidence, and reject the State’s claim that counsel had a
strategic purpose in mind.
The State makes the same backward argument here. Despite the clear record
evidence showing counsel’s repeated attempts to admit the threat testimony, the
State reimagines the case with new facts where counsel does not actually want to
admit the evidence. The State wants this Court to ignore the record and rewrite the
facts consistent with this new narrative. But, like the Court of Appeals in Millett,
this Court should judge counsel’s decision in the real-time context of the case, as
demonstrated by the record. Here, this Court should find that counsel made
repeated attempts to admit the threat testimony as part of the defense theory. The
question is, given that theory and the need for the evidence, could a reasonable
defense attorney fail to respond to the State’s erroneous hearsay objection?
Here, Scott asserts that his defense counsel’s performance fell below the
objectively reasonable standard articulated in Strickland when he failed to make
any argument in support of admitting the defense’s key piece of evidence. Like trial
counsel in Millett, counsel here was clearly trying to present the defense, and had
Scott’s counsel made the correct argument, the defense’s objective (to admit the
evidence) would have been met. Moreover, because the value of the evidence was
so significant for the success of Scott’s defense, there was no reasonable strategic
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reason not to admit the evidence, as was the case in Millett. Thus, Millett provides
a strong analogy to the present case and demonstrates why this Court should affirm
the lower court’s opinion.
3. Defense counsel performed in a manner no other competent
attorney would have performed
Teresa’s threat was clearly admissible and Tracy clearly wanted to tell the
jury about it. Defense counsel could easily have overcome the prosecutor’s
objection by making an elementary evidentiary argument. Yet, admittedly, the trial
judge may have incorrectly sustained the objection, even if defense counsel had
given a proper argument. Had he done so, Scott would have been able to raise a
visibly different claim on appeal than ineffective assistance of counsel, that of
preserved error. The fact is, trial counsel failed to make any argument over the
prosecutor’s objection, precluding a preserved error appeal, and performed in a
way no other competent attorney would have performed.
The State seeks to justify this performance by arguing that counsel “already
had more than enough [evidence] to add the threat piece to the larger extreme
emotional disturbance puzzle.” Pet. Br., pg. 37. This argument misses the point.
No reasonable attorney would conclude, after repeatedly failing to argue anything
in response, that the threat was unnecessary. No reasonable attorney would
repeatedly try to admit the evidence and then think, ‘I could argue it’s not hearsay,
but I’ve already got enough evidence, so I’ll just move on without responding.’ A
competent attorney would have raised the necessary evidentiary argument to
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overcome the prosecutor’s first objection and get this important testimony
admitted, or at the very least, properly preserved the issue for appeal.
Still, the State argues that Scott’s deficient performance claim rises or falls
with the value of Teresa’s threat to the whole evidentiary picture. Scott does not
disagree that the rest of the evidence is important, but he does disagree with the
limited evidence the State suggests should be considered. The State lists several
important facts, asserting that this evidence obviated any need for admitting
Teresa’s threat. For example, the State argues, “Defendant testified that he felt
threatened by Teresa in many ways—the open safe, the missing gun, Teresa
opening the garage door and leering at him, and Teresa being angry with him and
starting fights.” Pet. Br., pg. 36. The State even asserts that on the day before the
shooting, Scott called his mother and said, “Mom, I’m afraid. The gun safe is open
and a gun is missing. And I think Teresa is going to kill me.” Pet. Br., pg. 10
(quoting R.277:25). Also, in an attempt to undercut Scott’s claim to distress, the
State maintains that despite Teresa’s threat, Scott still “slept by her side” during
the nights leading up to Teresa’s death. Pet. Br., pg. 35.
The State’s recitation of these facts overlooks other important facts. In the
days leading up to Teresa’s death, Tracy tried to convince himself to stay with a
friend (R.278:122–23), called his bishop to help him decide whether to call the
police (R.278:128), hid in the garage rather than go inside where Teresa was
(R.278:128), and even refused to go to the bathroom inside the home with Teresa
there (R.278:127). Critically, the State forgets to mention that when Tracy shot
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Teresa, he discovered her 9-millimeter Beretta laying near her on the ground next
to the bed, fully loaded, with a round in the chamber. R.278:132. But all these facts
make Teresa’s threat more probative, more important to the defense, not less. Even
with all this other evidence, it would be difficult to both explain why Scott felt so
distressed on the day of the shooting and to prevent the jury from believing Tracy
himself “substantially caused” that distress. But, had counsel admitted Teresa’s
threat, it could explain why Tracy believed Teresa’s was going to harm him, why
seeing Teresa’s gun removed from the safe was so distressing, giving the jury a
reasonable basis to find that Teresa’s actions caused Tracy’s distress, as opposed
to his own overreactions.
Competent counsel, knowing the value of this evidence, and knowing it was
perfectly admissible, would have overcome the prosecution objection to the
proffered evidence. Defense counsel, here, failed to do that. Because counsel had
no strategic reason to not admit the evidence, failed to make a basic evidentiary
argument to overcome the prosecutor’s objection, and acted in a way that no
competent attorney would have, the defense’s key piece of evidence was excluded.
Such action plainly meets Strickland’s standard for deficient performance.
C. The Specific Content of the Contested Threat Was Not Required
for the Court of Appeals to Find Counsel’s Performance Deficient
The State maintains that “[w]ithout knowing the content of the threat,
concluding that it necessarily would have strengthened the defense was mere
speculation.” Pet. Brf. at 43. The Court of Appeals did not rely on the content of the
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threat to reach its conclusion; nor did it have to. As to the deficient performance
test, the details of the threat were significantly less important than the source of
the threat. Defense counsel admitted multiple pieces of evidence to support Scott’s
defense of extreme emotional distress, pointing to Teresa’s gun missing from the
open safe, Teresa glaring at Scott in the garage on multiple occasions, Tracy’s
unwillingness to go inside the home while Teresa was there, his unwillingness to
even use the restroom while Teresa was inside, and Teresa’s hostile behavior
towards Scott on the day of the shooting. R.278:112, 128, 127, 131. But, this
evidence, taken as a whole, may not have been sufficient for the jury to believe
Tracy was under extreme emotional distress caused by someone else’s action at the
time of the shooting. Rather, this limited evidentiary picture would, and likely did,
lead the jury to believe Tracy had “substantially caused” his own emotional
distress.
The jury likely believed Tracy overreacted to his circumstances, causing his
own distress. It follows then, that if the jury could hear testimony that Teresa had
actually made a verbal threat to Tracy in the days leading up to the shooting, it
would change the source of Tracy’s distress and change the way the jury viewed
Tracy’s interpretation of Teresa’s other actions. No longer would Tracy’s
overreaction be the sole cause of that distress, but the jury could impute
responsibility for that distress onto Teresa for verbally threatening Tracy which he
continued to consider and view each new circumstance in light of the threat. Thus,
the fact that the record did not contain the contents of the threat matters
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significantly less than the fact that the Court of Appeals understood the evidence
was a verbal threat from Teresa.
That missing piece of evidence was sufficient justification for the Court to
conclude that defense counsel had performed unreasonably in failing to admit the
threat. In other words, the question is whether defense counsel could reasonably
raise his defense, and overcome the “substantially caused” barrier to that defense,
without the threat. The Court of Appeals concluded he could not. It pointed to the
prosecutor’s closing argument, who asked the jury “what reasonable basis does
[Tracy] have to make [the] claim that simply the absence of that gun from the safe
creates extreme emotional distress[?]” Scott, ¶33. Without the threat, Tracy had
no reasonable basis to make that claim. The Court of Appeals’ reasoning mirrors
this conclusion. Scott asks the Court do to the same.
II. TRIAL COUNSEL’S DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE CAUSED
ACTUAL PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENSE, CREATING A
REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT THE TRIAL’S OUTCOME
WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT
Strickland also requires a defendant “show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 687. “This requires showing that counsel’s
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is reliable.” Id. “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. Instead,
Strickland requires the defendant show “there is a reasonable probability that, but
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for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. at 694.
As it did in the previous issue, the State complains the lower court had an
inadequate record on appeal, and thus could not properly reach the question of
whether defense counsel’s actions prejudiced the defense. Without the specific
contents of the threat in the record, the State argues, the Court of Appeals could
not evaluate the prejudicial effect on trial counsel’s unprofessional errors. Pet. Br.,
pg. 47. Again, the State exaggerates Strickland’s requirements regarding the record
on appeal. Neither prong of the Strickland test demands a complete, perfect
record, absent of any errors. Rather, Strickland and its progeny require an
adequate, unambiguous record.
The record on appeal in this case is both adequate enough, and clear enough
to establish that had defense counsel succeeded in admitting Teresa’s threat, the
defense’s key piece of evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome. Scott does not deny that the content of the threat is persuasive, this is
exactly the reason he filed a 23B motion to the Court of Appeals as a backup in case
the court disagreed with the IAC claim in his brief. But Scott denies that the Court
of Appeals was unable, based on the existing record, to conclude counsel’s error
was prejudicial. But for counsel’s failure to admit the testimony, the trial would
likely have resulted in a different outcome. Scott respectfully asks this Court to
affirm the lower court’s opinion.
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A. Whether the Record on Appeal was Inadequate is Not a
Threshold Issue for Evaluating the Merits of Scott’s Prejudice
Claim
In 1992, Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure was adopted,
“designed to address the inadequate record dilemma” in ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶14, 12 P.3d 92. In such claims,
“counsel’s ineffectiveness may have caused, exacerbated, or contributed to the
record deficiencies, thus presenting the defendant with a catch–22 unique to
claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel.” Id. at ¶12 (citing Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1036,
n. 6 (noting ineffectiveness of counsel as an example of the type of error that may
arise outside the record)). With the adoption of Rule 23B, however, “a ready
procedural mechanism for addressing the inadequate record dilemma was grafted
into the appeals process.” Id. at ¶14.
Rule 23B permits a reviewing court “to remand the case to the trial court for
entry of finding of fact, necessary for the appellate court’s determination of a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel.” UT.R.APP.P. 23B(a). “In this light, appellate
courts need no longer treat the question of an adequate record as a necessary
threshold issue.” Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶17. Instead, if the record “appears
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply
will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively.” Id.
Litherland obviates the need for a Court to conclude, based on the adequacy
of a record, whether to proceed into a defendant’s ineffectiveness claim. Yet, the
State begins its prejudice argument by making an assertion that conflicts with
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Litherland’s holding. Because the record was “legally insufficient,” the State
argues, the Court of Appeals’ “prejudice holding fails for this reason alone. And
because prejudice is a necessary element of an ineffective assistance claim, the
entire claim fails for this reason.” See Pet. Bf., pg. 48. As explained above, however,
this Court has clearly established that the question of an adequate record is no
longer a threshold issue. Moreover, Scott availed himself of Rule 23B’s procedures
by filing a motion for remand.6 The Court of Appeals never ruled on Scott’s 23B
motion, issuing its decision without deciding whether Scott had met the
requirements under Rule 23B. In doing so, the Court of Appeals found itself
capable of analyzing the prejudice prong of Strickland’s test without
supplementing the record with the words of Teresa’s threat. The State complains
this is error.
However, in grating the State’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, this Court did
not address as an issue on appeal whether the lower court erred in completing its
Strickland analysis before ruling on the 23B motion. Therefore, despite the State’s
contention that the record is “legally insufficient” (Pet. Bf., pg. 48), Scott
respectfully asks the Court to proceed in the following manner: 1) Make a finding
that the record is adequate for the purposes of conducting a Strickland analysis
and affirm the lower court’s conclusions; 2) Give leave for Scott to file a 23B motion
to this Court to supplement the record on appeal; or 3) Remand the case for the

6

See Addendum B.
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Court of Appeals to rule on the prior 23B motion Scott filed in that court.7 Scott
maintains that the Court of Appeals was correct, and that the record is adequate
for disposition of this appeal, and sufficient to find trial counsel’s performance
prejudicial to the defense.
B. The Record on Appeal Adequately and Clearly Establishes the
Need to Admit Teresa’s Threat During Trial
As indicted above, the Court of Appeals found the record adequate to
conduct its Strickland analysis. It noted that while the jury had heard Scott testify
that there was a threat made, “he was not allowed to offer any other information
regarding the threat, including the surrounding circumstances, the words used,
and the effect it had on him.” Scott, ¶33. The court contrasted Scott’s impeded
testimony with the closing argument of the prosecutor, who stated Teresa “was no
threat” and asked the jury “what reasonable basis does [Scott] have to make [the]
claim that simply the absence of that gun from the safe creates extreme emotional
distress[?]” Id. Had Teresa’s threat been admitted, the court concluded, “Scott
would have given the jury more evidence on the very point that was in dispute.” Id.
Whether Scott experienced extreme emotional distress before the shooting
proved to be some point of contention during deliberations, since “the jury notes
demonstrate the jury was at an impasse over whether Scott had substantially

7

What this Court cannot do, what it must not do, is reverse the Court of Appeals’
decision on the grounds that the record is inadequate without allowing Scott access
to Rule 23B to supplement the record. Scott followed the rules, and filed his motion
with accompanying affidavits. To reverse the Court of Appeals and deny Scott’s
appeal without having his 23B motion ruled on would be fundamentally unfair.
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caused the distress he felt.” Id. at ¶34. Testimony about Teresa’s threat would have
“reinforced the sentiments” of the two jurors who believed Scott acted under
extreme emotional distress. Id. Additionally, other jurors suspecting that
“substantially caused” meant “the majority of the time,” would have been
influenced by this testimony. Id. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals made a logical
conclusion based on these reasonable outcomes: “had Scott been allowed to testify
about the threat, there is a reasonable probability the jury would have continued
to be deadlocked, ending the case in a mistrial.” Id. That probability was enough
to undermine the court’s confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668).
For the State, however, the court’s analysis operated in a vacuum, failing to
consider all the evidence presented at trial. Pet. Br., pgs. 48–49. To prove special
mitigation of extreme emotional stress, the State argues, Scott must have been
“exposed to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress that would have caused
the average reasonable person under the same circumstances to experience a loss
of self-control and be overborne by intense feelings, such as passion, anger,
distress, grief, excessive agitation, or other similar emotions.” Pet. Br., pg. 49
(quoting State v. White, 2011 UT 21, ¶26, 251 P.3d 820 (quoting, in turn, State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 471 (Utah 1988))) (internal quotation marks omitted). Scott,
the State claims, “did not act under distress… Nor would a reasonable person have
reacted in the same way Defendant did….” Pet. Br., pg. 50. Instead, the State
asserts that Teresa’s killing was the result of disrespect and bullying. Id.
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The State’s arguments and factual recitations seem to overlook how
distressful Tracy’s circumstances truly were. The couple’s fighting had grown
significantly worse in the days leading up to the shooting, the “get in your face, yell,
scream at each other, spit flying…” kind of fighting. R.278:107; 160. Then, on the
day before the shooting, Scott first noticed Teresa’s gun missing from the couple’s
safe. R.278:112. Contemplate that for a moment. At a time when this couple was
fighting worse than they had ever fought, Teresa introduced a gun.
Tracy worried that Teresa was going to use the gun to harm him, and refused
to go inside while Teresa was there, even to the point that he preferred to urinate
outside to avoid her. R.278:117, 125–127. While working in the garage, Tracy
noticed Teresa leaning her head out of the door and staring at him, at least on two
separate occasions. R.278:128–29. Then, when Teresa began yelling at him from
inside the house, Tracy snapped and stormed inside. R.278:131. When Tracy came
into the bedroom, he was still thinking about that threat and that gun, and when
he looked down he saw Teresa’s gun missing again, so grabbed his own gun and
shot Teresa. R.278:131. Immediately after shooting Teresa, Tracy found the
missing gun within inches of Teresa, next to the bed, fully loaded, with a round in
the chamber. R.278:131.
The jury was tasked with finding whether Tracy acted under the influence of
extreme emotional distress, whether the “then-existing circumstances expose[d]
him to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress” that caused an “extreme
emotional reaction”. R.200. Specifically, the jury was asked to determine whether
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a reasonable person under these circumstances would have “experienced a loss of
self-control and had his reason overborne by intense feelings such as anger,
distress, grief, excessive agitation, or other similar emotions.” R.200, see also
UTAH CODE §76-5-205.5. The jury was instructed that emotional distress did not
include “distress that is substantially caused by the defendant’s own conduct.”
R.199. With the law of special mitigation in mind, the State argues “[Scott] could
not prove that he acted under extreme emotional distress. His theory was simply
unbelievable.” Pet. Br. 50. If that is true, it is precisely because the jury did not hear
the one piece of evidence that would have contextualized and legitimized Tracy’s
fear that Teresa was going to harm him, the piece of evidence that would have shed
light on why Teresa’s other acts, like yelling at time from inside the home,
repeatedly staring at him from the door, and repeatedly removing her gun from the
safe would have caused him extreme distress. As the Court of Appeals noted,
without this evidence, the jury would not have understood “any other information
regarding the threat, including the surrounding circumstances, the words used,
and the effect it had on him.” Scott, ¶33. Instead, the jury was left with unspecified
testimony that some threat had been made. The significance this evidence would
have had is evident when the jury’s questions are reviewed. Even the limited
evidence the jury did hear caused an “absolute impasse.” R.182, 280:78. Even
without knowing how Teresa had threatened Tracy, some of the jurors were
convinced he was not the one who substantially caused his extreme emotional
distress. R.182.
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But without testimony about the threat, the jury eventually did not find that
Tracy acted under extreme emotional distress when he shot Teresa. This missing
evidentiary link was absolutely crucial to the defense, and as the Court of Appeals
concluded, “had Scott been allowed to testify about the threat, there is a reasonable
probability the jury would have continued to be deadlocked, ending the case in a
mistrial.” Scott, ¶34. This conclusion was not controversial. The threat evidence
tied the entire story together for the defense. The threat evidence showed why
Tracy’s seemingly outrageous behavior was rooted in a legitimate emotional
reaction to Teresa’s conduct.
The Court of Appeals did not have had the specific details of Teresa’s threat
before it, nor could it relied on those details during its prejudice analysis.
Nonetheless, the importance and weight of the fact that there had been a threat to
the entire evidentiary picture and to the possible success of Scott’s defense was
squarely on the mind of the court. As such, the court’s conclusion represents an
appropriate analysis of a reasonably likely alternative outcome, but for trial
counsel’s deficient performance. For these reasons, Scott respectfully asks this
Court to affirm the lower court’s opinion and remand the case for a new trial.
C. If the Record on Appeal is Inadequate This Court Should Allow
Scott to File His 23B Motion or Remand to Allow the Court of
Appeals to Grant the Motion
If the Court finds the record is inadequate to determine prejudice (or
deficiency for that matter) the Court should not reach the merits of the case.
Instead the Court should grant leave for Scott to file his Rule 23B motion.
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According to Rule 23B motions for remand must be “filed prior to the filing of the
appellant’s brief.” UT.R.APP.P. 23B(a). However, given the procedural posture of
the case, a 23B motion would not be appropriately filed unless and until this Court
finds the Court of Appeals erred by ruling with an inadequate record. That
circumstance would fall within this Court’s ability to “remand[] the case under this
rule on its own motion at any time if the claim has been raised and the motion
would have been available to a party.” Id.
The motion filed with the Court of Appeals is prepared and can be filed as
soon as the Court will accept it. The State’s response filed with the Court of Appeals
is prepared and conceivably, the State could file it immediately.
Finally, if this Court is not prepared or interested in deciding the 23B
question, it should remand the case to the Court of Appeals with an order to rule
on the previously filed 23B motion. Scott has no doubt that he has met the
requirements for a 23B remand.
CONCLUSION
Though the State characterizes trial counsel’s performance as reasonable
trial strategy, the facts of this case neither support that argument, nor provide
justification for counsel’s failure to admit the threat. Where admission of the threat
evidence was clearly part of the defense, a competent attorney would have made
the basic evidentiary argument necessary to admit the threat. Trial counsel made
no argument for its admission. Such inaction, therefore, falls below the objectively
reasonable representation required by Strickland.
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Counsel’s inadequate representation prevented the jury from hearing
evidence necessary to find that Teresa caused Scott’s extreme emotional distress.
While the State underestimates the impact of this testimony on the jury, the record
clearly establishes that the jury felt conflicted about whether Tracy or Teresa had
caused his distress. If Teresa’s threat had been presented in evidence, there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different,
that the jury, or at least one member of the jury, would have believed special
mitigation applied. For these reasons, Scott respectfully asks this Court to affirm
the Court of Appeals’ decision, and remand the case for a new trial.
If the Court finds the record is inadequate, the Court should grant Scott leave
to file his 23B motion, or in the alternative, remand the case to the Court of Appeals
with direction to rule upon the 23B motion.
In any event, because the Court of Appeals did not rule on Scott’s verdict
urging claim, unless this Court remands for a new trial on ineffectiveness grounds,
the Court should remand to the Court of Appeals to address the remaining issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of December, 2017.
/s/ Douglas Thompson
Appointed Appellate Counsel
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TOOMEY, Judge:
Tracy Scott was convicted of murdering his wife. He
appeals, contending he received ineffective assistance of counsel
during trial. We agree and reverse and remand for a new trial.
<j[l

State v. Scott
BACKGROUND
<[2
Tracy Scott and Teresa Scott1 were married for nineteen
years. They had two sons.
<[3
Scott and Teresa's relationship was both "good and bad."
Some described it as happy and loving, but it was also
contentious, and they fought often. The fights were "explosive"
and involved taunting, threatening, name calling, profanity, and
sometimes, throwing things at each other. Each of them
frequently threatened divorce, and Scott threatened Teresa's life
"multiple times."
<[4
The police were called to the couple's house on a number
of occasions and in 2008 cited Scott for domestic violence. In that
incident, the couple argued, Scott tried to hit Teresa with their
car, then threw a towel over her face and punched her in the
stomach. Teresa filed for a restraining order and they separated,
but she later had the restraining order removed and Scott's
citation was expunged. The pair reunited.
<[5
Many of the couple's arguments revolved around
finances. The family incurred debt so Teresa could earn a degree,
but her lack of employment after graduation was a source of
conflict. Teresa criticized Scott for spending money on trips and
firearms instead of paying bills or having their roof repaired.
<[6
Some witnesses testified Scott was the aggressor in the
couple's fights-that he got more upset and was "more
aggressive" than Teresa and that he was responsible for
"[e]ighty percent" of the contention. Some testified that Teresa
"escalate[d]" the situation, that she "nitpick[ed] and push[ed]"

1. Because the parties share a last name, we refer to Teresa by her
first name for clarity, with no disrespect intended by the
apparent informality. See Earhart v. Earhart, 2015 UT App 308, <[ 2
n.l, 365 P.3d 719.
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Scott, and kept "gnawing [at] him" and did "not let stuff go."
Scott's coworkers testified that Teresa frequently called his cell
phone while he was at work, and the two would argue over the
phone. If Scott did not answer his phone, Teresa would call the
shop phone or come to his workplace. These calls occurred
several times a week, sometimes two or three times a day, for
four or five years.
<[7
Leading up to the events of this case, Scott and Teresa's
relationship "started to get bad again." Her calls to Scott's work
became more frequent. Remarks between them "got nastier" and
"more hateful," and in the weeks before her death, Scott and
Teresa had "constant arguments." Their fighting was "[w]orse
than it had ever been."
<[8
The day before Teresa's death, Scott and Teresa began
"fighting and arguing" while Scott was changing the oil in a
family car. The argument got "really bad." Scott spilled oil in the
driveway, and they continued to fight about the spill and the
lack of money to replace the oil. Later, Scott saw that Teresa's
mother had called, and he took the phone into their bedroom to
give it to Teresa. He saw her crouched by the end of the bed, but
did not know what she was doing. As he turned to leave the
room, he saw that the family's gun safe had been pulled out
from under the dresser where it was usually kept and that it was
open. He also saw that Teresa's gun was not in the safe.
<[9
Scott testified he was "scared to death" when he saw the
gun was missing. He was nervous and worried, and he went to
the garage and stayed there until their sons came home. He did
not sleep well that night. The next day Scott ran errands, and
while he was putting new tires on the car, twice purchased the
wrong size because he "[wasn't] thinking straight." Scott did not
want to go home and instead called a coworker to ask if he could
spend the night at the coworker's house. The coworker
responded that he could meet Scott later that day, and Scott
went home. He did some yard work, but he and Teresa were
fighting the "whole time."
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<[10 Scott went inside the house to use the bathroom. As he
walked into the bedroom, he saw Teresa sitting by the end of the
bed. Although the gun safe had been shut and put away under
the dresser, it was again open and pulled out, and Teresa's gun
was still missing. Scott immediately left the house without using
the bathroom. He went to the garage, and while he was there, he
saw Teresa several times leaning her head out the door and
staring at him. Scott called his ecclesiastical leader because he
"didn't know what to do"; he testified that he "really start[ed] to
wig out, just freak out."
<[11 Finally, Scott decided to return to the house and
"confront" the matter. As he walked in, he could hear Teresa
talking on the phone with her mother. While he was in the
kitchen, Teresa yelled at him, and he "snapped" and "[saw]
red." He stormed into the bedroom where he saw her lying on
the bed and pointing her cell phone at him. He looked down at
the safe and saw that her gun was still missing. He reached
down, grabbed the other gun from the safe, and shot Teresa
three times, killing her, then called 911. The police arrived and
arrested Scott.
<[12 At trial, Scott admitted to killing Teresa, but he argued
that he had acted under extreme emotional distress, which
would mitigate the murder charge to manslaughter.
<[13 Scott testified that "there was a threat made" and when he
saw Teresa's gun missing from the safe he "thought the threat
was serious." Defense counsel asked him to elaborate: "When
you say a threat [was] made, are you saying-Who threatened
who?" As Scott started to explain the background of the threat,
the prosecutor objected that it was hearsay. The court sustained
the objection and in a sidebar conversation stated, "There's no
way that you're going to dance around and get [in] a threat
without [it] being hearsay." Defense counsel said "Okay," and
did not offer any counterargument. Counsel continued his
questioning, asking, "After you saw the safe open ... then what
were you thinking?" Scott replied, "I was thinking that the threat
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that I had received the day before ... [t]hat she was going toshe was .... " The court interrupted Scott and called for another
sidebar discussion. The court warned defense counsel to stay
away from that line of questioning, because "the only responses
[it was] getting are clearly hearsay." Counsel agreed and made
no attempt to argue that the statements were not hearsay and
were admissible. Scott did not mention the threat again.2
<[14 At the conclusion of trial, the court instructed the jury on
the elements of murder and the special mitigation of extreme
emotional distress. The instructions stated:
A person acts under the influence of extreme
emotional distress when the then-existing
circumstances expose him to extremely unusual
and overwhelming stress that would cause the
average reasonable person under that stress to
have an extreme emotional reaction, as a result of
which he experienced a loss of self-control and had
his reason overborne by intense feelings such as
passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation,
or other similar emotions.
The instructions also stated that '"[e]motional' distress does not
include . . . distress that is substantially caused by the
defendant's own conduct."
<[15 The jury deliberated for more than five hours and sent
two notes to the court. One note asked, "What is the legal
definition of 'substantially caused?"' The next note informed the
court, "We are at an absolute impasse, 6-2," and continued,
"Two feel that 'substantially caused' needs to be 'the majority of
the time."' Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis that
2. Scott's testimony did not include the actual words of the
threat. The threat's content is not included in the record on
appeal, and we do not rely upon it in our analysis.

20140995-CA

5

2017UT App 74

State v. Scott
"absolute impasse" meant that the jury could not "continu[e] to
deliberate without doing violence to their individual judgment."
The court denied the motion for a mistrial and instead gave a
supplemental jury instruction, which asked the jury to "continue
[its] deliberations in an effort to agree upon a verdict." The
instruction stated, in part,
This trial represents a significant expenditure of
time and effort by you, the court, the parties, and
their attorneys ... and there is no reason to believe
that the case can be tried again by either side better
or more exhaustively than it has been tried to
you ... . Nevertheless ... it is your duty as jurors to
consult with one another and to deliberate, with a
view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so
without violence to your individual judgment.
<[16 After receiving the supplemental instruction, the jury
deliberated for two more hours and found Scott guilty of
murder. Scott was sentenced to prison for fifteen years to life. He
appeals the conviction.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
<[17 Scott raises two issues on appeal. First he contends the
trial court erred by giving a verdict-urging instruction when the
jury was at an absolute impasse. He also contends his counsel
provided ineffective assistance at trial. Because we conclude
Scott did not receive effective assistance of counsel and reverse
on this basis, we need not address the propriety of the court's
supplemental instruction.
<[18 When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised
for the first time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to
review, and this court must decide whether the defendant was
deprived of effective assistance as a matter of law. Layton City v.
Carr, 2014 UT App 227, <[ 6, 336 P.3d 587. To demonstrate
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ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his
counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced by the
deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984).

ANALYSIS
I. Deficient Performance

<[19 Scott argues that his counsel's performance was deficient
because, when the prosecutor objected to testimony regarding a
threat Teresa made to Scott, defense counsel did not attempt to
argue the threat was nonhearsay and thus admissible. Scott
asserts defense counsel had no tactical purpose for failing to
make this argument.
<[20 To show deficient performance under Strickland, Scott
must demonstrate that counsel's performance "fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. This standard
asks "whether an attorney's representation amounted to
incompetence under 'prevailing professional norms,' not
whether it deviated from best practices or most common
custom." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Scott must also "rebut the strong
presumption that 'under the circumstances, the challenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy."' State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, <[ 19, 12 P.3d 92 (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689) (additional internal quotation marks omitted).
<[21 Scott argues on appeal that Teresa's threat was not
hearsay and was therefore admissible. "Hearsay" is defined as
an out-of-court statement that "a party offers in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." Utah R.
Evid. 801(c). Scott argues the threat was not hearsay because it
was not offered to show the truth of the matter asserted-rather,
it was offered to show its impact on Scott. See R. Collin
Mangrum & Dee Benson, Mangrum & Benson on Utah Evidence
779 (2016) (noting that statements may be relevant "because of
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their effect on the hearer" and that such statements have
"consistently been held to be nonhearsay in a variety of
contexts").
<[22 The State conceded on appeal that the threat was not
hearsay, and we agree with both Scott and the State that the
threat was not hearsay. Like questions and commands, threats
are commonly not hearsay, because they do not make assertions
capable of being proved true or false. See United States v. Stratton,
779 F.2d 820, 830 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that a defendant's
"threats are not hearsay because [they were] not offered for their
truth; the threats are verbal acts"). Here, Scott's testimony
concerning the threat was not offered to prove the truth of what
Teresa asserted but was offered to show its effect on Scott. Scott's
defense depended on demonstrating he shot Teresa while under
extreme emotional distress not caused by his own conduct.
Testimony about the threat's impact would further Scott's
defense that his distress came from an external source. And as
Scott testified, when he saw that Teresa's gun was missing from
the safe, he "thought the threat was serious." Whether the threat
"[was] true is irrelevant, since the crucial factors are that the
statements were made and that they influenced the defendant[' s]
behavior." See State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah 1980)
(concluding testimony was not hearsay when it was offered,
"not to prove the truth of what [the informant] said to
defendants, but rather to show that [the informant] had made
statements which induced defendants to commit the offense").
<[23 The threat was not inadmissible hearsay, and it follows
that if defense counsel had demonstrated this through proper
argument, the court would have allowed Scott to testify about it.
<[24 Scott next argues that his counsel's failure to correctly
argue the rules of evidence fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. We agree.
<[25 In this instance, defense counsel failed to correctly use the
rules of evidence to support Scott's defense: counsel did not
argue the threat was admissible because it was offered to show
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its effect on Scott, rather than to prove the truth of what Teresa
asserted. Counsel's failure was unreasonable, especially in light
of Scott's trial strategy, which was to show that his distress
originated outside his own behavior. A serious threat to Scott
from Teresa would have been an important piece of evidence at
trial, and a reasonable attorney would have used the rules of
evidence to explain to the court why the threat was admissible.
Counsel's lack of argument did not merely "deviate[] from best
practices or most common custom" -it amounted to deficient
performance. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011).
<[26 The State argues defense counsel's performance was not
deficient because "counsel had a sound strategic reason not to
seek to admit the specific words of Teresa's alleged threat."
Further, it argues defense counsel did not seek to admit the
specific words of the threat because an "imaginary threat" could
have had a greater impact on the jury than hearing the actual
words.
<[27 We do not agree that this was a sound strategic reason for
counsel's actions. While an "imaginary threat" could have
allowed the jury to conjure something worse than what Scott
would have testified to, the converse is also true. Testimony
about the threat's actual content could have connected it to
various other aspects of Scott's testimony, including Teresa's
threatening behavior in other contexts, and would have
established the foundation for testimony about Scott's reaction to
seeing the empty gun safe. As it was, Scott did not testify about
it and counsel did not refer to it in closing argument, even
though the underpinning of Scott's defense was that he acted
under distress not substantially caused by his own conduct.
Under these circumstances, the negative repercussions of
omitting the content of the threat were greater than the possible
benefits; admitting its content would only have strengthened
Scott's defense. We therefore conclude defense counsel's actions
could not have been sound trial strategy.
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<[28 Because the threat was central to a defense that focused
on trying to show that Scott's conduct originated from distress
caused by a source other than his own conduct, there was no
strategic reason for counsel not to argue that the threat was
admissible. Scott has therefore met his burden in showing that
his defense counsel's performance was deficient.
II. Prejudice
<[29 To demonstrate prejudice, Scott must show there is a
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694 (1984).
<[30 Scott argues that prejudice is evident because "the jurors
expressed their concerns about the very point of law that the
excluded evidence would have had a significant impact on."
Because Scott admitted he killed Teresa, the sole issue at trial
was whether the killing was mitigated by extreme emotional
distress. The notes the jury delivered to the court indicate its
deliberations had narrowed in on the definition of "substantially
caused." This suggests one or more of the jurors was struggling
with whether Scott had "substantially caused" the distress he
was experiencing. The second note illuminates how the jury was
split: "We are at an absolute impasse, 6-2. Two feel that
'substantially caused' needs to be 'the majority of the time."'
Only after a verdict-urging instruction and two more hours of
deliberation did the jury arrive at a guilty verdict.
<[31 Scott argues the jury's second note demonstrates that two
of the jurors, if not more, 3 believed Scott was "suffering under

3. The jury stated it was "at an absolute impasse, 6-2" and that
"[t]wo feel that 'substantially caused' needs to be 'the majority of
the time."' At a minimum, two jurors apparently believed at that
(continued ... )
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the influence of extreme emotional distress" not substantially
caused by his own conduct. As a result, Scott reasons that if the
jury had been given more specific evidence regarding the threat,
there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would
have been different.
<[32 The State argues there is no reasonable likelihood the
outcome of the trial would have been different if the jury had
heard the specific words of Teresa's threat. The jury heard
testimony from Scott that Teresa threatened him and that he
believed the threat was serious. The jury also heard that after
Scott saw the gun missing, he was "scared to death" and
"worried that Teresa was going to use that gun to do some harm
to [him]." Because of this testimony, the State argues that the
"specific words of [the] threat ... would have added little, if
anything, to what the jury already heard."
<[33 Even though Scott testified that "there was a threat made"
and seeing that Teresa's gun was missing from the safe made
him think "the threat was serious," he was not allowed to offer
any other information regarding the threat, including the
surrounding circumstances, the words used, and the effect it had
on him. After the court warned defense counsel the threat was
hearsay and would not be admitted, counsel did not inquire into
it again and did not argue, or even imply, that the threat played
a role in special mitigation. In contrast, the prosecutor's closing
argument stated that Teresa "was no threat" and had not

( ... continued)
point that Scott was acting under extreme emotional distress not
substantially caused by his own conduct. It is also possible two
other jurors did not believe Scott qualified for the mitigation
because he had caused his distress "the majority of the time."
And it is not impossible that six jurors believed Scott qualified
for mitigation, while the other two maintained that Scott did not
qualify because he had caused his distress the majority of the
time.
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"provoke[d] him" and asked the jury "what reasonable basis
does [Scott] have to make [the] claim that simply the absence of
that gun from the safe creates extreme emotional distress[?]" For
these reasons, we are persuaded that testimony of the specific
threat and its effect on Scott would have given the jury more
evidence on the very point that was in dispute.
<[34 In sum, the jury notes demonstrate the jury was at an
impasse over whether Scott had substantially caused the distress
he felt. At least two jurors were so convinced that Scott acted
under extreme emotional distress that the jury described its
position as an "absolute impasse." Testimony about the threat
would have directly reinforced the sentiments of these two
jurors. That testimony also might have influenced the jurors who
believed that "substantially caused" meant "the majority of the
time." Consequently, had Scott been allowed to testify about the
threat, there is a reasonable probability the jury would have
continued to be deadlocked, ending the case in a mistrial. This
probability is enough to undermine our confidence in the
outcome of this trial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
694 (1984).

CONCLUSION
<[35 We conclude Scott received ineffective assistance of
counsel and therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.

VOROS, Judge (concurring):
<[36 I concur in the majority opinion as a correct statement and
application of the law. I write separately to express my concern
with the law of extreme emotional distress as it presently exists
in Utah, particularly as applied in the context of intimate
relationships.
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<J.[37 The facts of the present crime must be viewed against the
backdrop of a relationship in which Scott was the usual
aggressor. He would call Teresa names like "bitch" or "just
anything ... that could hurt her and make her feel like she was a
bad person." In fact, his contact name for her in his cell phone
was "Bitch Teresa." Scott threatened "multiple times" to kill
Teresa, promising that "'one of these days I'm going to kill
you."' In fact, he did try to kill Teresa once, attempting to run
her over with their SUV while their sons were in the back seat.
Teresa jumped out of the way. The boys also saw Scott "get
physical" with Teresa. One time he threw a towel at Teresa's face
and "started punching her in the gut." Another time he
"slammed" a vacuum into her legs.
<J.[38 Teresa would also get mad and yell, but she did not get as
angry or aggressive as Scott. The boys never saw her "get
physical" with him, call him names, or threaten him. She did call
the police a few times. Scott called the police too. During one of
the police visits, Scott asked the responding officer to tell Teresa
to "stop touching" him. In all, the police came to their home "six
to eight times." They arrested Scott on one occasion (he pleaded
guilty to domestic violence assault). Teresa obtained a protective
order, they separated, but they soon got back together. On the
day of the shooting, one of the couple's sons received a call from
a friend who asked why the police were at his house; the son
called home and nobody answered. He rushed home, worried
that Scott had "finally killed her." When the other son heard
there had been a fatal shooting, he worried that his "mom was
dead."
<J.[39 And what, according to Scott, ignited his extreme
emotional distress? After a fight, he noticed a handgun missing;
he heard Teresa on the phone with her mother; she yelled
something to him; he stormed into the bedroom and saw her
lying on the bed pointing her cell phone at him. In response, he
grabbed a gun from the gun safe, cocked it, and shot her three
times.
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<JI40 I do not believe the law should mitigate the culpability of
one who kills under these circumstances. "What is generally
known as the provocation defense has for two decades been
criticized as mitigating violence committed by men against
women in intimate relationships." State v. Sanchez, 2016 UT App
189, <JI 40 n.9, 380 P.3d 375, cert. granted, 390 P.3d 719 (Utah 2017)
and 390 P.3d 727 (Utah 2017). It now "is one of the most
controversial doctrines in the criminal law because of its
perceived gender bias; yet most American scholars and
lawmakers have not recommended that it be abolished."
Carolyn B. Ramsey, Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on
Feminist Homicide Law Reform, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 33,
33 (2010); see also Emily L. Miller, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary
Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model Penal Code, 50 Emory L.J. 665,
667 (2001) ("Voluntary manslaughter has never been a femalefriendly doctrine."); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern
Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 Yale L.J. 1331, 1332
(1997) ("Our most modern and enlightened legal ideal of
'passion' reflects, and thus perpetuates, ideas about men,
women, and their relationships that society long ago
abandoned."); Laurie J. Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and
Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33
UCLA L. Rev. 1679, 1679 (1986) ("[T]he legal standards that
define adequate provocation and passionate 'human'
weaknesses reflect a male view of understandable homicidal
violence.").
<jI41 In my judgment, the law should mitigate the culpability
of homicides only where society as a whole can to some degree
share the rage animating the killing:
To maintain its monopoly on violence, the State
must condemn, at least partially, those who take
the law in their own hands. At the same time,
however, some provoked murder cases temper our
feelings of revenge with the recognition of tragedy.
Some defendants who take the law in their own
hands respond with a rage shared by the law. In
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such cases, we "understand" the defendant's
emotions because these are the very emotions to
which the law itself appeals for the legitimacy of its
own use of violence. At the same time, we continue
to condemn the act because the defendant has
claimed a right to use violence that is not his own.
Nourse, 106 Yale L.J. 1331, 1393. This "warranted excuse"
approach would mitigate the culpability, for example, of a man
who murders his daughter's rapist, but not one who murders his
departing girlfriend. See id. at 1392.
<JI42
But this is not the law in Utah. And here, at least some
members of a properly instructed jury seemed to struggle with
whether, on these facts, Scott was entitled to special mitigation.
In this circumstance, under present law, I cannot say that my
confidence in the verdict is not undermined. But like Judge
Christiansen, I urge our legislature to revise section 76-5-205.5 so
that it can no longer be used to mitigate the final act of abuse
perpetrated by an abusive intimate partner.

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge (concurring):
<JI43 I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that
defense counsel's performance at trial was deficient when he
failed to argue that the alleged "threat" made to Scott by Teresa
was non-hearsay. As explained by the majority, supra <JI 22,
Teresa's alleged threat to Scott was not a statement offered for its
truth and thus fell outside of the definition of hearsay. See Utah
R. Evid. 801(c); United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 830 (2d Cir.
1985). Competent defense counsel should have known enough to
correctly argue that the rules of evidence would allow the jury to
hear this testimony. And, while I do not believe that hearing the
specifics of the alleged threat would ultimately have made a
difference in the jury's verdict, I recognize that it is "not within
the province of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for
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that of a front line fact-finder." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, <JI 24, 147
P.3d 401. Therefore, I agree that remand is warranted.
<J{44 However, though I agree with the majority opinion, I
write separately to voice my concern regarding the current
statutory implementation of the extreme emotional distress
(EED) defense. I do not believe the EED defense should have
been available to Scott. After Scott had abused and threatened
her over the course of several years, he shot an unarmed Teresa
three times, including once in the mouth, while she was lying on
their bed with her cell phone in her hand. In my view, this
"reaction" to the marital difficulties combined with an alleged
threat by Teresa does not create a situation in which Scott should
be able to claim he was exposed "to extreme emotional distress"
that would reasonably explain and mitigate his loss of selfcontrol. Though our courts have employed a generous approach
to the EED defense, see, e.g., State v. White, 2011 UT 21, <JI 29, 251
P.3d 820, we must still consider the circumstances surrounding a
defendant's purported EED from the viewpoint of a reasonable
person. "Thus, the legal standard is whether the circumstances
were such that the average reasonable person would react by
experiencing a loss of self-control." Id. <JI 36 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
<J{45 I do not agree with Scott's assertion that a difficult and
contentious marriage, combined with Teresa's alleged threat,
could have resulted in the type of extremely unusual and
overwhelming stress that would cause "the average reasonable
person" to experience "a loss of self-control." See id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Allowing the defendant to
claim special mitigation under facts such as these undercuts and
de-legitimizes the proper purpose of the battered-spouse aspect
of the EED defense.
<J{46 Indeed, the availability of the EED defense to persons in
Scott's situation highlights the defense's problematic history. As
this court has recently stated, and as noted in Judge Voros's
concurring opinion, "What is generally known as the
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provocation defense has for two decades been criticized as
mitigating violence committed by men against women in
intimate relationships. It now is one of the most controversial
doctrines in the criminal law because of its perceived gender
bias[.]" State v. Sanchez, 2016 UT App 189, <JI 40 n.9, 380 P.3d 375
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting
authorities), cert. granted, 390 P.3d 719 (Utah 2017) and 390 P.3d
727 (Utah 2017); see also, e.g., James J. Sing, Culture as Sameness:

Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and Culture in the Criminal
Law, 108 Yale L.J. 1845, 1865 (1999) (noting that the "provocation
doctrine has its historical roots in a value system that embraced
the oppression of women"). It is true that EED defense
jurisprudence has come a long way since the old common law
provocation/heat of passion defense. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439, 468-70 (Utah 1988) (plurality opinion) (discussing the
evolution of the EED defense in Utah), overruled on other grounds
as recognized by Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, 293 P.3d 345. But, as
applied here, the EED defense allows an abusive defendant such
as Scott (who had committed domestic violence against Teresa
and who had at one time been the subject of a restraining order)
to claim that the cumulative emotional stress of a difficult
marriage and a single alleged threat mitigated his otherwise
unprovoked murder of his wife. By doing so, the current
statutory implementation of the EED defense gives continued
life to antiquated notions of spousal control and perpetuates a
belief that violence against women and intimate-partner
homicide are acceptable and legitimate. The law should not do
so. I therefore urge our legislature to review Utah Code section
76-5-205.5, and to consider explicit recognition in the statute that
an abusive spouse or partner cannot claim special mitigation
under these types of circumstances.

20140995-CA

17

2017 UT App 74

Addendum B – Scott’s Rule 23B Motion filed in the Court of Appeals

lJcße(˕ĉQ˕ *ǥJń(Jǵ˕ƒ V&@qC˕
-V5@a M[LZa$[6EC7a :<:K9:Sa TTM7a
Y Æ ˕ '˕c\?ˆ˕ e,Ö˕  ?˕&C@˕
f\.˕ c*˕!G@C Æ˕
*"Q˕ !CV,!Y&, ÆC+C˕
eLʒ˕\˕eǫ˕

+,ó 

  

(**µ˕J˕c*ļ.˕
 #& -a#a%#+*a a
Ǻ"˕ óe".˕

-+#&+ *a*-$%#&+a
&- a v$ó #+#a+#a&  a

n˕

1+a#%3a


*ǼRȏ˕RJ**.˕
˕ó e""Lÿ˕

 -a

 a%&#%#*

a#&

&a

R˕àk˕ &CǁGCqqYúRe˕

RJǯ(˕àJŋ×˕eǬĎ.˕ ˕˕\ ˕ ".˕ ˕   ˕˕3 ˕&N˕˕
&N^˕˕©˕cɞ˕\ "˕˕"˕f\ \.˕ \˕ ˕˕Ǯ\ ˕˕f˕
˕e L\?˕˕  \˕˕e"ƍ˕É˕˕3˕\˕˕Ƕů˕ ˕
?ȯ˕ǩȼ4˕˕˕R ˕˕˕f\˕ J\ÿ˕ *˕å˕
ò˕˕ɸÙ >˕˕¸˕L˕˕ ,˕
 #& -a #a%#+*a a-+#)+ *a
LUQM9\8WBMLa
·˕ \˕ \˕ ˕ O˕ ˕ \˕ ˕ ɣ˕ ä˕ Ƚ˕ ė˕ ä˕  `ƙ˕ ˕
 ˕Ⱥ\˕ɓ˕ ˕Ʉ˕˕\˕˕˕˕`˕`%˕˕¼ɤ˕\˕
˕\",˕ -)#29< ,$-&$2³@@˕c,(˕ @@!.˕ @!+ !!.˕ @qC˕ Vq!G,˕¶˕ɬ˕

'˕˕  ˕4 Ħ˕ 4˕4

˕' ˕ª5˕˕;˕'˕4 v˕

Ś4˕, , , ˕˕˕5˕'˕ ʉ9˕ 4˕% 5˕˕'˕  4  ˕ 46,d˕ 0 #2G@@˕
c,,˕ @@!.˕ @qC˕ #ó O˕ ½ ˕ '˕  ˕ '˕ '˕ 44˕ ˕ 4 v˕
 4˕% ˕ ¼ 4˕˕'˕,˕¶˕ 4˕%' ˕ʁ ¼ 4˕˕˕  ˕ħ˕
˕˕˕ 4˕˕4   ˕4 ɱ˕4Oɉ4˕˕ .˕˕  ˕˕ ˕ē˕ˉ˕
%'˕ 4˕˕ ¼ 4˕˕˕ 6˕'%˕¦ ˕˕˕ª ˕ ˇ˕'×˕ ˕
 ˕4Uv˕  ˕¤ .˕ē˕  6˕˕'˕ 4˕% ˕'˕˕Ì ,˕
B˕ ˕  Ŷ˕ ˕ ˕  ˕ Áő4˕ ˕

˕ 4Ʌ4˕ O˕ '˕

 4,H˕ -) #2 ˕@qG,˕
3 ˕ &ǆ^˕  ' Ġ˕ ē˕R

˕˕ ½O˕4 ˕ 4¹˕ Ƃʬ˕ŵ'˕¦ ˕4U ˕  ˕¦ʡ˕

˕ ˕ ˕ 4×˕ 4ȟ˕  ˕ Ë'˕ Rˊvč˕ ˕ ˕ ˕ 49˕ ˕ 4˕
O4˕ ˕ 4 nd˕ cȂǙǣ˕ [n˕ BʀŅa˕ fǻǸ˕ &N^ħĨü˕ *'˕ Á˕  t˕ '˕ '˕ O˕
ʇ˕ ƁƤ4 ˕ ˕ ˕ 4Ã˕ O˕ ɑš˕  ˕ ˕ '˕ 4Ě˕ ˕ w˕
%'4'˕ ˕  ÁÂ˕ 4 ˕   ˕ ˕ ɻO˕ '˕ t˕ 4 ˕ %˕ 4,H˕ 2 *'˕
ªʜ˕ ˕ ˕ ½˕ ˕  ˕ '˕ ʈ4 ˕ %'˕ 4˕ %˕ 5%Ö˕ ˕ Ğ '˕ ˕
  ˕4˕˕'˕ 4 °H˕ --2 9< '#,-'#2 &CCC˕ 7/¸B˕ &qCī˕ ź˕ !ƚ˕ FN˕f,N˕ Æ+Yĵ˕
*'˕ ½½ O ˕ ˕ ɗ˕ ˕ '%˕ ' ˕ ˕ ˕ O˕ ˕ ˕˕  ˕ ˕
ʂ ˕ Ș'˕ ˕ 4 ˕ ˕ OÍ4×˕ 44˕ ˕ '%˕ ' ˕ ˕ ˕ ˕
˕¦ ˕ 4 OĦ˕  ɹ4˕%6˕ 4O˕%'O˕ ˕ ˕ ˕  ŵ˕ O˕˕
¦'˕ v˕ ' ˕ ¼4˕ O˕ '˕ %'˕ O˕ Ȱ˕ ' ˕ '˕ O˕

%

˕ ˕ ʷa˕

*˕ ÙU˕ ˕ U ˕ /M˕ /˕ %p˕ ˕

 U/˕  ˕ ǂ˕˕˕/M˕ ˕˕U˕ ˕ Ğ˕
B˕^t˕ ˕/UU˕%ʭ˕˕R

,˕

*++"+a#a(/+a+*

`a

=RMHaXA:aP:8MR9a
f U "˕fU ˕
B˕ * ˕ (˕ B˕ /˕ ˕ Ï ˕ ˕ ˕ Ǧʌ˕ l ˕
É .˕ ǡU ˕ l ˕ R

M˕ ɏ ˕ ˕ ˍ˕ ä˕ / ʊ .˕ ˕  ˕ ɘ˕ ,˕

(˕˕ ¤˕ ˕˕˕˕ç˕¸˕˕˕˕ ˕Rʸ˕ 9ðó R ˕
ľ",˕
* ˕*/˒˕
* ˕˕* ˕(ˁ˕/˕  ˕ Vq!+Ĭ˕˕ ˕˕>˕ Q˕3a&+!I!N
!G,˕ Ň˕  ˕ ˕ /¤˕ ˕ VqqG˕  ˕ Ğ˕ ª% ˕ %˕ ˕ ˕ ˕ d.˕ ʲ˕ =% ˕
 ˕˕ ˕/d˕  ˕ ˕ ª˕ ˕  ,d˕Čn&+!I!Gi˕ *˕ /˕ ˕ (/˕% ˕
˕ ˕ %©˕  ˕ %˕ M˕ ã˕ ˕ ȃƹ˕ Ý% M˕ ˕ ˕ %˕ =˕
˕ d˕ %»˕ ;˕ ˕ ¼ ˕ ˕ ,˕ 3n&!+I!@,˕ B ˕ ˕ã M˕ @Y˕ ˕ +C˕
 ˕˕˕/˕©˕% ˕ ĐĖƛ˕ ˕˕ ˕˕˕/˕ŝ˕% ˕=˕˕ ˕
]U˕˕Q , Q ˕˕ ˕˕˕ Ǝ˕ýd˕3&+!I!@ !+ı˕ l

#<

˕ ˕»˕(˕

B˕ / ˕ ˕  //ʢ˕˕˕ ˕ /˕ ˕ ˕˕B`˕Ǜ ,˕ Ł˕

  ˕˕ ˕ ˕e"˕"˕ ˕/˕/ ˕ ˕ ˕ ˕˕
ʱ˕˕U˕ ˕˕ ˕/ƺ˕
%

gªqLH¸ 0LL<¸;H¸ ªLH¸ N;e¨¸[ X+!Ǔ˕ÆăD ˕ (L¸D;ssLH¸ _L¸;¸ CeD`¸ e¸ O;E¸N ¸;¸ eyL¸`L¸
D ;E¸e¸`e¸` L¸O ¸/LL;¸¯<¸%eD`¸/LL;¸[²&+!kF D ˕)¸L¸ O eªq¸bL<¸
;H¸  P<eµ¸ /LL<¸ E ªqH¸;H¸¯ ªrH¸ ª¸e¸ ª¸ j]`¸C<Dn¸<¸-E ¸[ X+!{ V´!a˕
0aL¸ seFL¸ `<H¸CLL¸D;rrLH¸ e´¸ ¸Le^_¸eyL¸ eEsªHe]¸ L¸eyL¸e¸XDD!˕ ¸ &DDA˕
¯`L¸ -E ¸¯<¸D`;]LH¸¯e`¸H yLeD¸f rLDL¸ [ X+!k!!Õ˕ ADn˕ &«e]¸`;¸eEeHL¸ -E ¸
_L¯¸ ;¸  ¯Ls¸ Þó 1LL< ¸ O;DL¸ <H¸eee;LH¸ zL¸ neH¸ N¸ `µeE<s¸ E <E¸ Le`L¸;¸ ªE`¸
¸ ;¸ ` L¸ Ķǃ+!ǔ˕FYXƢYǅĶ˕ 1_;¸ fEgHL¸ tLH¸  ¸ ;¸ L{ A¸ L<;e ¸ Cª¸ _L¸ ¯ ¸
D ªqH ¸LLz¸ ¸;µ¸<@¸<H¸ .D ¥¸ LªLH¸` zL¸ [ &+!{!! !Aa˕/`L¸E ªqL¸] ¸  yL¸
D ªLse]¸ V y¸ `Le¸ Ce` ¸ <H¸ eLH¸  ¸ e| L¸ `L¸ Ls<e _e¸ [ƴX+ǊkAFƵ˕ /_e]¸ HeH¸
ey ®L¸ N ¸ <¸ ezL¸ ;H¸ aL¸ R]`¸ _;¸ `L¶¸ HeH¸ `<L¸ ²LL¸ ;¸ qe¦qL¸ E;ryL¸ `=¸ CLO L¸
 X+!IAF ˕$DD Hi]¸ ¸/;D¶¸_L¸§ ¸]L¯¸ª¸;H¸ LI¸`e¸]<{L¸ O¸G;vre]¸_L¸D ¸
CLD;ªL¸ e¸ ¯;¸ H i]¸  ae]¸ Cª¸ `ªe]¸ ª¸ <H¸ _ªe]¸ ª¸ E_esHL¸ ;H¸ _ªe]¸ ª¸   ¸
Lª<e ¸e¸bL¸D yyªe©¸[ Ǆǉ!{AX ˕
)¸ = bL¸ eEeHL¸ f¸ XDD´˕ _L¸  rhDL¸ °LL¸ E;ssLH¸ <[L¸ -D ¸ ;H¸ 2LL<¸ CL];¸
S]`e]¸ L¸ ;¸DLrs¸` L¸ D L¸/_;¸He<^LLzL¸qLH¸ ¸ -D ¦¸neDne]¸3LL;¸Cµ¸ªj]¸
`e¸O

¸<^<e¸ `L¸ ¸ªrs¸ ¸_L¸Cu<nL¸[ X+!k˕F ăG ˕*¸ ? `L¸eDeHL¸`L¸ seDL¸¯LL¸

D<qqLH¸ CLE;ªL¸/LL<¸ ª¸eyr¶¸¯ ªqH ¸  ¸  ªD_e]¸ -E ¸ [ƶ&+!IFGa˕ -D ¦¸<nLH¸
`L¸  seDL¸  ¸ Lsr¸ 2LL;¸  ¸ ¸  ªE`e]¸`ez¸[ X+!kFY´ ˕ ,QDL¸ ( ±Mss¸L HLH¸ ¸
L¸ N¸ `LL¸ eDeHL¸ ;H¸ HL<q¸ ¯e`¸ _L¸ E ªrL¸ C¶¸ ¡oe]¸ -E ¸ O ¸ eHL<r ]¸ N ¸ _L¸
<\L

¸[ &+!I V´ØF+Ƙ˕X´ X+ ˕

ó

^˕ XDDA˕ ˕ ˕ _˕ ˕ =

˕ ;d˕  ˕ ˕ _˕ 7˕ ˕ _ 7˕

ȷɷ˕ _ ˕  ˕ %˕ =˕  ˕ ˕   ˕    dM˕ '˕ 9˕ %˕ =;˕ _˕
Ë79 č˕ ,d˕ aX+!{AX²˕ * ˕ %˕ % 5y˕  ˕ B;˕ (˕ 709˕ ˕ ˕ ˕ _ ˕
Q˕ ĴXÜ!{ANa˕ * ˕ %˕ 7˕ w˕ ʋ˕ 7˕ =7˕ ;˕ 7'˕ 7'7˕ ˕   ˕
 8˕ ƻd˕ ,X+!{AXa˕ Bŗ ˕ * ˕ Ŝ  ˕ ˕ =
 5˕779;˕˕ ˕8 ˕˕ d˕˕7˕ 
Ň˕ ˄˕  7˕ _ 7˕ w˕ 

˕ ˕ ˕  ˕ ¥˕

˕˕ 9˕˕˕_;Q˕ĮXÜ!ǕAGa˕

˕ ˕ _7M˕ _ ˕ * v˕ 5˕ ˕ % 5Ɯ˕ _ 7˕

 9˕_w˕ _ 7˕%˕˕ ˕7˕K˕  £˕w˕8 ˕˕ ˕˕  ˕˕
ˎ9M˕ 8 ˕ ˕ ˕ ˕ 
  99;˕
˕ ˕ 

 ˕ ˕ 

˕ Œ˕  .˕  ˕ _ɽ ˕ * ˕

,˕ ķX+!{AGƣDXa˕ *˕  7˕ _ 7˕ 7˕ ˕ 7˕ (7˕  ˕ $% 7 £˕
˕ ˕  7˕ ȸɲ˕ 7˕ ˕ ˕ ˕ _˕  ˕ K˕ ˕ ±˕ [ķXÜ!{˕GX˕ (˕

7 ˕* ˕Ĝ7˕˕˕  ˕7M˕_ 9˕9˕˕'˕97£w˕5˕)9˕
˕7˕˕ v7˕ ˕_ ˕% ˕

˕_ ˕ÔÔ©˕% ˕˕˕˕˕ ˕09,d˕

aX+!{˕GN GG,˕

¥ó'˕%5˕  ˕=7˕d˕˕ ˕=0  ˕˕ ˕7˕Ë* ˕  öȕ˕
˕˕ ˕K7˕%˕˕  ˕%˕ ±d˕[aX+!{˕Þ˕DNƷĺ˕ *˕˕

09˕79˕

ĺ˕ ^ ˕˕,XÜ!{˕YA˕ ƓJ˕ ˕K˕ (7˕˕7˕˕%˕˕ ;ö7˕
8 ˕%7˕7˕ ˕%˕đ7˕_ ˕%˕˕

0˕˕%5˕  ;˕˕

;w˕ 8 7˕9 ˕ =˕ ˕ 9K˕ ˕   d˕(˕ ˕˕˕9˕7˕%5˕
_ ˕˕79˕%˕= ˕7˕˕ ˕ a ± ˕·˕Ə7˕˕ ˕; ˕7˕ ˕%7˕˕
ɕ˕7ŭ ˕%97ƼdĨQ˕
%

˕ÔÔ˕˕ ".˕ "˕  H˕ ˕ "Ʋ˕ 3 &+!IZD+ ˕ ·˕˕ =˕ ˕ 
 ˕ .˕y˕ŕy˕
 ˕ "˕ ˕

˕  .˕ "2.˕ 

˕˕

H
˕ ˕ɩ ˕˕ ˕3 &+!Ǒ˕¡óD+.˕&+!I˕F@D ˕ * ˕˕żǨʺ˕˕  ˕

˕   <˕E˕˕EH ˕ Č &+AIAÛ ˕

g ˕ ˕  "˕s;˕˕˕ < ˕˕y ˕ ˕ .˕ >5˕ ˕25˕;2 ˕
 ˕ ˕ ˕    Ú˕ 3 &+!I VDN ˕ *˕ s˕ 
e



ù> ˕ Ȗ ˕  2˕   ˕ 3 &+!ÇZDG ˕

˕ ˕ *  ˕T˕s˕ =˕ GYƊ˕) ˕˕NDĸND˕ yɈƱH˕3 &+!I VDG ˕ ņ˕2ř˕ o õ˕

" ˕ ^ ˕ :˕ ˕ ʨ˕ ˕ ˕   ˕ 3 &+A{˕F˕DG²˕ o˕  ˕ ˕ ˕ 

˕ ˕

˕ ˕ ˕ g E˕ ; ˕ o ˕ ˕đ; ˕  ˕  ˕ 3 &+!I VGY ˕ g E˕
 

; ˕o ˕    ˕  ˕ ˕  y˕=ōȔ ˕ ¿ ˕õ ˕ < ˕ ˕˕ 5˕˕˕ ˕
"˕ ś ˕ ˕  H˕ 3 &+!I VDYÚ˕ * ˕  ˕ ˕  2 ˕ ˕ ˕ :˕ ˕ ˕  <z˕
ø˕ ˕ g ˕=˕H ˕3ÿ&+!IÛG+˕g E˕   ˕ ˕ ˕˕˕   ˕ ˕˕
  ˕˕ś ˕˕ .˕ ˕ř ˕¿˕ E ì ˕:˕˕ ˕˕  2˕˕= 5˕˕ō č˕
ʏ"˕U˕E˕< ˕ s ˕ ˕  ˕ñ ĵH˕3 &+!Ç VDYn˕
*˕  ˕  ˕ ˕  ˕ ¿˕ ˕ g ˕  ˕ "> ˕ ˕   ˕ Ȑ<˕ <˕ ʩ˕
 ˕ 3 &+˕!Ç˕VAY ˕ g E˕ =˕   H.˕ =˕ : ˕ H˕  ˕ ˕ =ʠ˕ E

 H˕

3 &+!ÇÛA@ ˕ g z˕ ˕˕)5˕˕˕˕ ˕˕ =: ˕  ơ  ì ˕ ˕
˕ ˕ ˕  H˕3 &+!ǒĹA@ ˕
J˕  .˕ ˕ ˕ ˕ñ˕<.˕ g ¿˕  ˕˕ ˕˕ s˕˕˕>˕ <"˕
 ˕+˕ÇND˕ ˕!˕IDD˕  ˕<˕˕Ž ˕ sH˕˕ž5 ˕˕˕ ˕ ˕s ˕˕˕¸

ſ˕

3 &+!I˕ZD
˕ ! ˕ g E˕ ˕o ˕=Ï˕s< ˕˕  ˕ ˕ H˕ >˕˕˕˕:˕ ˕

ó

-D ¸;H¸`L¸C µ¸HLDkHLH¸ ¸D`;]L¸`L¸ kq¸k¸dL¸D;¸3 &+!ǌ˕ZÄ
˕ !˕4`L¸D;¸¯B¸`L¸ ªDL¸
N¸ D Lk ¸  ¸ k¸ ¯;¸ L¸ N¸ ¢L¸ Ck]]L¸ kLy¸ N¸ D Lk ¸ 3&+AIANƭ˕ 'ªk]¸ `L¸ ks¸
D`>]L¸ 4LL;¸ ;H¸ -D ¸¯LL¸ T]`k]¸ ;H¸ ;]ªk]¸ ;¸ -D  ¸  rqLH¸ C;Dp¸;H¸N `¸ ªHL¸
bL¸ D; ¸3&b!I˕ŀ˕Ä!®ÄA ˕ 95:`L¸ sH¸TsL¸¯;¸ ¸ D
kq¸LL³`LL¸ íómª¸ U

nLH¸ ¸ `L¸ ,k]¸  xrLH¸ ª¸>H¸k¸

HLH¸`L¸HkL¯;µ¸¯k`¸ ks#· ¸3Ĳ&˕+!Ǎ˕ƿÄA˕ 6`L¸ bL¸ D ªwL¸ N ª]`¸

L¸`L¸kqsLH¸ kq¸3 &+!Ą VÄA ˕
1`L¸ ` L¸ ;]¸ ;H¸ -D ¸;¯LLH¸ k¸ `L¸ ];;]L!¸ +¸ ¯B¸ 1LL; ¸ y `L¸  ¸ -D ¸


n¸`L¸ ` L¸k ¸`Lk¸CLK
¸;¸ 

y¸¯`LL¸cL¸;¯¸4LL;¸  ¤ ¸¢L¸ W ¸ N `L¸CLH¸ kk]¸

s¸ D ªD`LH¸H ¯¸ ;¸dL¸CLH¸ k¸ X ¸ N¸ bL¸ CLH¸ D ªD`LH¸ H ¯¸3 ŀĈǷ® Þ Ĉi˕ -D ¸

HkK¸ p ¯¸ ¯`;¸ `L¸¯;¸ H k]"¸ 3Ʈ&˕+!I˕Þ ɯɰ˕ -D ¸rL;LH¸ ;D ¸ `L¸ D }L¸ N¸ bL¸ CLH¸
`L¯¸ `L¸ ` L¸ ¸ `L¸ CLH¸ ;H¸  sH¸ 5LL;¸ k¸ ¯;¸ `L¸ y `L¸3i&+!IZ V& ˕ $¸ -D ¸ 

H¸

C;Dn¸ª¸`L¸  kDLH¸`;¸`L¸]ª¸;NL¸¯;¸ªrsLH¸ ª¸Y y¸ªHL¸`L¸HLL¸¯`LL¸k¸ªª;srµ¸
;µLH¸ k¸ ¯;¸ L¸ ;H¸¢LL¸¯;¸ rµ¸ L¸k s¸ k¸k¸ 3&+!ǎ˕Z V& ˕$¸%LL;¸ A˕ yksrlyLL¸
k s¸ ¯;¸ ykk]¸ Z ~¸`L¸ ;NL¸3a&+!IZÅ@úÅ+i˕
-D ¸ ¯;rnLH¸C;Dn¸ ª¸  ¸ `L¸ ];;]L¸ 6`L¸ ykk]¸ k s¸ ~;HL¸ `ky¸`kp¸;C ª¸ `L¸
8LHLH;µ¸ CLN L¸ ¯`L¸ `LL¸ ¯;¸ ;¸ `L;¸ y;HL¸ ;H¸ `L¸  ¯¸ £ ª]d¸ `L¸ `L;¸ ¯;¸
Lk ª¸ 3i&b!IZÅ&ØāN˕ -D ¸ ¯;¸ ¯ kLJ¸ `;¸ 5LL;¸ ¯;¸ ] k]¸  ¸ ªL¸ `;¸ykk]¸ ]ª¸
 ¸ H ¸  ~L¸ `;y¸  ¸ `ky¸ 3Ĳ&b!I˕ÅÅ+˕ 5;Dµ¸ ¯;¸ L ª¸ `L¸ L¯LH¸ ;H¸ ¯ lLH¸ `L¸ ²;¸
D;LH¸ ¸HL;`¸3±&+!ǏZā+i˕ -D ¥¸D;rrLH¸ `k¸ y `L¸;H¸ ;µLH¸ ¬¸k¸`L¸ ];;]L¸ ªkr¸`L¸

GǕ

' ˕˕',˕ (À˕˕˕À˕ ˕t˕=ėɪ˕¡˕ ˕˕Ñ˕'˕
r ˕Ĕ Q«˕3 Wb!Ą VWD ˕
ã'˕r˕*'˕Ñ5˕˕(˕˕˕û˕3ƯWbAIA@ ˕(˕˕˕˕ v˕
5˕ ˕  ˕ ˕ǿ5˕ ˕6 ˕ ˕ ˕r Ö˕  ˕ ˕  ˕Ĕ,˕ 3 WbAĻA@ ˕ j'˕
˕ (ʰ˕'˕ 6˕ ˕Ŝ˕ ˕ ġ˕ 5˕Ĕɥ6˕ ˕ 6r6Q«˕3 WbAkA´ĳ˕
*˕K˕ M˕ Ř ˕ '˕ '˕ ˕ 6˕ů˕ .˕ (À˕ 6˕ 6r˕ r˕ 6 66˕ ˕
6 n˕ 3 Wb!ĄZWZ ˕ Ý˕ ˕ ˕ ˕ r  ˕ ʳ˕ ;˕'˕ ˕ '6˕  5˕˕  ˕  6˕ ˕
˕  Q˕ 3 Wb!kZWZ®WW ˕ ã' ˕ ˕ 6 ˕ 6U6˕ ˕ ˕ʮ ˕ 66˕ 6˕
˕  6˕  ˕ Ñ˕  ˕ 6¡Ġ.˕  ˕˕ (˕ ˕ 5?˕6Ěr'û˕ 3 Wb!Ļ˕ǀWG ˕ (˕= ˕
v˕ ˕ ˕ ˕ «˕ 6˕ '˕ ˕ ˕ ú 5 ˕ ˕ 6˕ r˕ '˕  ˕ 6˕ ˕ 'r6˕ Q˕
3 Wb!kZWW®WN ˕ (À˕ ¤˕ ˕ 6˕ ˕ '˕ Ù 5 Ɛ6˕ ' 6˕  ˕ (Ñ˕  ˕ ] 6˕
˕ 'Q˕ 3 Wb!I VWG ˕ * ˕ ľ5 M˕ '˕ ĭ 5 ˕ 6˕ (˕ 6 ˕6ò66.˕ '¸˕
6 66˕ ˕ (ĝĝ6˕ ˕˕ '˕,˕ 3ĳĂb!kWZ! ˕ ·˕ ˕ '˕ ZY˕t6˕Ƒ˕5˕ (ĝÑ˕
v˕ ˕ ˕˕˕ űƝ˕= ˕ė˕˕65˕˕˕˕ű˕ƥ 6˕˕˕˕ƽ«˕
3 Wb!IW VA²˕ ȋ˕(˕˕˕˕˕r 6˕˕˕˕'˕˕= 6˕ 6nd˕
3 Wb!k VWG ˕
(À˕ʖ˕˕5 ˕6˕

˕ ȹ ˕˕¸,˕Ȍ˕(˕ ʯ r˕˕5˕'˕

 r ˕ ˕ ˕ 5t˕ ɦ˕ =5˕ ŷ˕ ˕ «˕ ˕ ˕  6˕ = ˕   n«˕
3ưWb!kZWY ˕ *˕  ˕   ˕ 6˕ ˕ ˕ ;˕ ˕ ˕ ˕  ƾ˕ 3 Wb!ǐZĂYĴ˕

#%

\û Ǖ %%Ǖ åǕǕ ^

Ǖ Ǖ ǕÜǕ /

Ǖ ¨ Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ àóĀ,Ǖ

Ǖ%Ǖ"G929'jǕ SǕǕ %Ǖ    Ǖ Ǖ ơ Ǖ"G'2ǕV˕K:Ǖ


] Ǖ  Ǖ  Ǖ

Ǖ UǕ Ǖ ǕǕ Ǖ F%Ǖ rǕ

@Ɖ Ǖ  Ǖ L Ǖ Ǖ

Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ /ǕǕǕ ǕǕ ſ%Ǖ Ǖ gǕ ǕǕė  ǕƊªǕ  Ǖ
  Ǖ

Ǖ $Ǖ "¿OQGǕ  ǄǕ Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ ? Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ  &Ǖ 3Ǖ Ǖ $Ǖ

 6Ǖ vǕ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ  Ǖ  ǕǕ  Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ
ê &Ǖ ǕǕ 6ǕǕ \ǕǕ   Ǖ  ǕǕ
 Ǖ 

Ǖ Ǖ 

¶ø Ǖ ǕåǕ%Ǖ
 &Ǖ

ŠǕYǕ Ǖ L&
%

$Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ  &Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ

ǕǕ ƚ$Ǖ"{'2GǕ Ǖ/ @VǕǕǕ

Ǖ Ǖ$Ǖ"ğG'|GǕAǕǕǕ
 FǕ  ǕċāIǕ ǕǕ

Ǖ "G'2Q:Ǖ œǕ

ĹǕ
Ǖ  Ǖ 7Ǖ ǕHǕ Ǖ "ĴĸG  ´Ǖ

Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ ? Ǖ ǕÙƋţǕ  

ǕǕ  Ǖ ǎǕ &Ǖ

 Ǖ 

ǕvǕǕ

ǕǕ ǕǕ@ǕYǕ

ƅǕǕÚ %Ǖ ǕǕ

Ǖ N$Ǖ "G'|O'Ǖ  Ǖ  Ǖ  Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ /Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ

$Ǖ@Ǖ  FǕ ñ ǕǕ

Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ 7Ǖ

Ƭ 3Ǖ

"¿G'2ŕǕ'Ǖ FǕ  ¸Ǖ& ǕǕǕ Ǖ  ǕǕ æ Ǖ"NG'ÊǕĵ'ǕaǕ ũǕ
ǕǕ ǕqǕ Ǖ  ´ǕǕ  Ǖ ǕH Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ  &Ǖ

 Ǖ© ǕǕ  Ǖ Ǖ

"G'|'ǕǕ  FǕ ǕªǕǕ @ǕǕ? &Ǖ &ǕǕ  ǕaǕǕƔ ůǕǕ
ǕǕ

ĺǕ

MǕǕ  Ǖ Ù0Ǖ Ǖ$ǕǕªǕ

ǕǕ"G'2ǕQ8Ǖ  ´Ǖ  Ǖ& 

 Ǖ ǕǕ/  VǕ

Ǖ /  $ǕǕ  FǕ"{'2Ǖ9Ǖ

ǕǕǕǕǕ3ǕǕ\ǕóǕ  F

%Ǖ Ǖ ǕǕǕǕǕ
%

 $Ǖ

Ǖ



#±±Ǖ Ǖ #ǕǕ Ǖ  *ǕǕ *Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  dǕ T-1'29-Ǖ #cǕ <4Ǖ
4~Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ #ÕŔǕu Ǖ Ǖ#*4ǕòǕǕ 4

Ǖ Ǖ#5[ǕAǕ?ƿǕǕ Ǖ*Ǖ*Ǖ

L&Ǖ [$ǕT-1'29-Ǖ AǕ ¥ 4Ǖ ǕǕǕ ?E ǕǕǕ Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ  L Ǖ v$Ǖ
ǕǕ  Ǖ  ǕUǕ*[Ǖ "1'29dǕ AǕ#4ǕǕaǕ Ǖ Ǖ 5 Ǖ ǕǕǕ
Ǖ 4&

Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ

ĠǕ "-1'2DKǕ #cǕ &Ǖ Ǖ  &Ǖ <

ČǕ + BǕ 44 Ǖ±ǕE

Ǖ Ǖ LEƻǕ  Ǖ qǕ

=Ǖ"J1'ŀD-Ǖ

 Ǖ ? 5$Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ ? Ǖ $Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ ? Ǖ ƪ Ǖ  Ǖ ®ġ$Ǖ Tz1'm DħǕ
ǕǕ 4 Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  ǕǕ Ǖ Ǖ 4Ǖ 5 Ǖ 5 Ǖ Ǖ  c,Ǖ ǕU*ǕǕ
Ǖ ç Ǖ Ǖ 5E *Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ # Ǖ Ǖ

[Ǖ TĨ1'2ǕR8-Ǖ  ǅǕ ?4~Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ ĲǕ

4&Ǖ ǕǕ#Ǖ  Ǖ ĳǕ 4&Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ <Ǖ ǕǕ Ǖ* ǕǕūǕ Ǖ4 &Ǖ
 [$Ǖ "-1'mǕDdǕ  cǕ ? Ǖ  Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  $Ǖ  Ǖ ?# &Ǖ EǕ  Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ
5[$Ǖ "d1'2D-Ǖ #cǕ Ǖ Ǖ ¶øǕ Ǖ  Ǖ

Ǖ ÚŤǕ  Ǖ 5 Ǖ Ǖ j$Ǖ

"1'2Ǖ D-Ǖ AǕ #ǕǕ ǕƹǕ &E Ǖ?šť Ǖ ,Ǖ 

[$ǕTd{'2ǕDǕ #cǕ 0ƌǕ

vǕǕ?Ǖ  Ǖ&E4Ǖ Ģ$ǕTĤ1'2RÁǕ AǕǕvǕ4#&Ǖ -8PǕ 

EcǕ Ǖ 

=Ǖ

"-1'2R6ǕǕe7EEǕ PǕ  ǕW7EǕ+ ˕
#cǕ ǕǕ aǕ *ǕǕY*ǕǕ Ǖ Ǖ

E kǕ a Ǖ #ǕòǕ4ç Ǖ

Ǖ  Ǖ ?4Ǖ ǕǕ  Ǖ Ǖ*Ǖ ŪǕ Ǖ 4 Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ =$Ǖ  vǕ

5Ǖ UǕ  Ǖ

 Ǖ ųǕ [Ǖ "d1'ŁǕDĥǕ #Ǖ ~Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ ǕǕ Ǖ  Ǖ&Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ
ǕǕǕ* ǕǕǕǕEģǕTd1'2ǕD-ǕaǕ4Ǖ ǕǕ ǕíǕ ǕǕ#q5Ǖ
?Ǖ ǕǕ $Ǖ <Ǖ Ǖ ÀǕ TĦ1'2ǕRDǕ a ,Ǖ 4E Ǖ Ǖ  ,Ǖ #Ǖ # 

%

 Ǖ

# BǕ Ǖ # Ǖ b Ǖ Ǖ rǕ 

Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ  ÂǕ "(;ËǕO:-Ǖ AǕ

/Ǖ BǕ  Ǖ  ǕǕ$Ǖ "Ã{;Ì:yǕ
#ǆǕ  Ǖ #fBǕ 9ĶOǕ "(;łO:Ǖ AǕ f&Ǖ Ǖ 9OǕ Ǖ Ǖ %


BǕ  ǕǕ

Ǖ ƞǕ  Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ

bǕ<ǕǕŶ Ǖ] ǕǕ #Ǖ#Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ #µǕ# ǕǕǕ

BǕ Þ#BǕ !Ǖ  Ǖ fǕ  Ǖ ƀ Ǖ Ǖ#¸Ǖ #Ǖ "(;ËǕ::Ǖ #Ǖ / üǕ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ
BǕ Ǖ

Ǖ  Ǖ  $ǕǕ Ǖ ĂǕ Ǖ  Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ ä CǕ gǕ  CǕƐǕ &Ǖ CǕ

 ǕYǕ  ǕǕǕä ĩ$Ǖ"(;Í::Ǖ
#µǕ ^ǕǕ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ ǕU

Ǖ  &ǕǕ ǕǕǕ

Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ% 3đǕ Ǖ

Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ ƜǐǕ / Ǖ   Ǖ Ǖ $,Ǖ / ,Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ b Ǖ ƢǕ Ǖ #Ǖ  ƑǕ
$Ǖ"(;|ǕO::Ǖ
\ BǕbǕ Ǖ #fǕ %Ǖ Ǖ  B Ǖ Ǖ &Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  #Ǖ Ǖ#Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ
BǕ Ǖ BǕ # Ǖ %Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ  jǕ "(9|99ĘÖÂǕ AǕƴǕ %CǕ  Ǖ
Ǖ /BǕ Ýƛ Ǖ & Ǖ $Ǖ"Ä(9ÌÖǕ ] Ǖ \ ǕǕ Ǖ Ǖ@ǕǕ Ǖ

bǕ

ǕǕñǕǕ Ǖ /%%Ǖ Ǖ $Ǖ"(9Í8Ǖ
\ǕƤ #Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ %Ǖ rǕ #ǇǕ #f ǕBǕ 9OǕ  Ǖ Ǖ  #ǕǕ
/%ǕBǕ Ǖ ZĒǕ Ǖ Ŏ7 EǕ Ǖ ]ƝǕ &Ǖ /]Ǖ Ǖ Ï$ēǕ #Ǖ f CǕ ªŁ˕  $Ǖ
Ǖ W7  Ǖ % Ò#Ǖ  Ǖ &Ǖ ăÕǕ Ǖ &Ï$Ǖ  Ǖ  ǈǕ 

Ǖ  CǕ /ŘCǕ Ǖ

B$Ǖ SǕ
Ō  Ǖ &Ǖ #Ǖ ǕǕ Ǖ  Ǖ

Ǖ Ǖ ábCǕ p Ǖ &Ǖ Ǖ p ŰCǕ  Ǖ

Ǖ Ǖ /]čǕ  Ǖ áb Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ &CǕ   Ǖ  b$ǕSǕ #Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ

ó

Ǖ Ǖ 3Ǖ Ǖ 

Ǖ rǕ Ǖ Ǖ ǕǕ  Ǖ UǕ Ǖ %ƩǕ · 

  Ǖ Ǖ

ǕÛǕǕǕǕǕǕZǕǕǕ Ǖ%%ǕĎďǕFǕǕǕZ,ǕǕǕ-Ǖ
SkǕ/ǕǕ

Ǖ&Ǖ Ǖ  ǕǕ Ǖ ǕǕYǕ ǕŴjZǕŏǕ

] Ǖ Ǖ   ǕƱǕ Ǖ Ǖ  ²Ǖ Ǖ`Ǖ L Ǖ ǕǕǕ %Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ
êëǕ/SǕǕǕ

ǕkǕ +¸ǕǕ ZǕX=Ç((2D9=ǕnƃǕ  Ǖ wǕ3ǕFǕL3ǕqǕ

Ǖ  Ǖ ǕǕ%Ǖ Ǖ ǕǕ  &Ǖ Ǖ 3Ǖ3ǕǕżǕ3ǕǕ L Ǖ

Ǖ

X=((28¼8R6ǕÈ9=Ǖa Ǖ Ǖ ǕǕ ǕǕǕ ǕĄfǕ Ǖ ǕCǕZǕXJ((Ń9K[Ǖ
\Ǖ   Ǖ ` Ǖ  Ǖ 3Ǖ Ǖ %Ǖ %Ǖ  Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ  %Ǖ  ĪǕ`Ǖ -Ǖ
X=((8ļ-Ǖ oź Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ F¯%Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ

,Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  6Ǖ  Ǖ õǕ

£ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  ǕǕ ǕXĬ((ń8;»8É=Ǖ
] Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ  « Ǖ Ǖ %Ǖ 3Ǖ 3« Ǖ 7% îǕ Ǖ  

Ǖ  õǕ

Ǖ  Ǖ `Ǖ â Ǖ ƟǕ  Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ ¦ -Ǖ ō+ Ǖ FƈǕ + Ǖ <  µǕ
 %Ǖ uǕ 

  6Ǖ ,Ǖ 

3 CǕ  Ǖ & Ǖ Ǖ

Ʒ36Ǖ

3 3öǕ ŭu CǕ  ,Ǖ «  6Ǖ îÀǕ X=Ç((RK,R6Ǖ(Ĕ;,;D69D,Ǖ (;=Ǖ

< ŐǕǕ*3

Ǖ Ɓ

Ǖ`Ǖ% Ǖ Ǖ²Ǖ&3Ǖǒ ƕǕ

ŖǕ Ǖ Ǖ ÜǕ 

ƯŮŬ Ǖřŷ Ǖ

¯ ǕǕ Ǖ ǕǕ%ǕǕ¥ ǕǕ ,ǕǕ `ǕrǕ

ǕǕ  Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  wǕ Ǖ ¢Ǖ  Ǖ 

% Ǖ rǕǕ&Ǖ ǕǕ

<ǕǕ "=((88DǕ (O¼(ºMǕ Ǖ o£ ǕÐCǕǕǕ`Ǖ ǉǕ ǕǕ Ǖ
ǑǕǕ  Ǖ ǕCǕ ŻǕ²ǕǕǕ Ǖ  Ǖ  Ǖ 
  Ǖ7

Ǖ%  Ǖ

ǕRKǕ  ǕǕ3Ǖ Ǖ ¯ ŲưǕ  VǕ ǕǕo£ Ǖ

ÔëǕX=((Ņ;,Ǖ99È=Ǖo¥ ǕA Ǖ¦Ǖ`ǕǕ ǕƲ¬Ǖ3Ǖ  ǕǕǕ
 w`Ǖ· ǕǕƥǕǕǕǕ  ¦ Ǖ%ZǕ ǕǕ/ ǕǕ ǕZǕ
X=(;2lK=Ǖ ąo

ǕǕę 

ǕǕ Ǖ  Ǖ,ǕǕ %ǕǋǕ 
%

-

 

  kZǕX(;2OKīǕ

 ǂǕ psǕ oÞ Ǖ A 6Ǖ Ǖ >+0Ǖ â  Ǖ Ǖ ®5>}Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  >Ǖ Ǖ /I44Ǖ 0ûǕ
00ýǕ >Ǖ /SǕ >Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ 0Ǖ s }ǔ-Ǖ "1'mǕllkǕ A Ǖ  Ǖ   Ǖ  hiǕ  >Ǖ
/0

Ǖ.Ǖ ĉSǕ° VǕƨǕ+¾VÿǕ "N1'ņlNǕA Ǖ Ǖ  ǕhHǕp0>Ǖ. Ǖ

/SǕhHǕ +Ǖ  Ǖ.ǕHǕ ,Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ =$Ǖ"N1'm:KNǕ
IǕ 5 + Ǖ 4  Ǖ 
 6Ǖ  Ǖ +> Ǖ L0Ǖ

Ǖ ž0Ǖ  ǃĊǕ5 ,Ǖ +

 Ǖ iHǕ Ɨ6Ǖ +

3 Ǖ Ƅ4 Ǖ }Ǖ+Ǖ Ǖ>Ǖ

4

Ǖ 

ǕǕã* HǕ

+ Ǖ  Ǖ .  sǕ   6Ǖ  Ǖ  Ǖ

ǕHǕ 0.,Ǖ :ǕH Ǖ 

6Ǖ :Ǖ ã6Ǖ Ǖ 0 Ǖ05ǍǕ

÷>Ǖ <6Ǖ >Ǖ ǌǕ  Ǖ 5 =Ǖ "Á11Î KQǕ ::Ě8ĕǕ KMǕ 8MǕ P,Ǖ :8MǕ 8P½8QMǕ lQK½QMǕ


916Ǖ Wù .+Ǖ ,Ǖe7 +Ǖ,ǕWú+. ǕĿ,ǕW7+.+ǕK,ǕW7Ƈ .+Ǖ Þ ĈM˕W7+. Ǖ,ǕW7+. Ǖ1MǕeú+ Ǖ
&ƕ˕ e7+. Ǖ ĽNǕ Ǖ 5

Ǖ  Ǖ ¡÷íǕ Ǖ  iVǕ .Ǖ +>Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ . sǕ >Ǖ iǕ Ǖ

+Ǖ <Ǖ 6Ǖ þ0+» Ǖ ¢ǕǕ hǕ +Ǖ<Ǖ Ǖ .$Ǖ +iǕ 0Ǖ  HǕsǕ Ǖ
Ǖ 5¾Ǖ"k11Êl:,ǕW7 . Ǖ8NǕ×Ǖ Ǖ3Ǖ Ǖ 

Ǖ Ǖ L0ǕǕ  ǕǕ

 +¤Ǖ pǕ + Ǖ  Ǖ¤Ǖ L0Ǖ iǕ .4 sǕ H3 NǕ W7 .+Ǖ :NǕ Ǖ >Ǖ 3Ǖ é Ǖ <Ǖ
iǕ . Ǖ ÛǕ  Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ ¡Ǖ ÝƘ®+>°Ǖ Ǖ >Ǖ +  Ź. Ǖ ¤ Ʈ

Ǖ

Ǖ =ǕŚ11ÎQPQQĖǕ 1'NǕ
IǕ0+  Ǖ70

Ǖ 5¡ƙǕ 7< 5Ǖ Ǖ\Ǖ  VǕ }Ǖ Ǖ > éǕ

Ǖ Ǖ <ǕǕǕǕ? HǕ ǕǕ ǕHǕ3ǕǕ Ǖp3ǕǕ0>3Ǖ
<ǕǕǕ}+ ǕǕ0
5 Ǖ Ǖ ù5Ɠ
0h6Ǖ Ũ

Ğ$Ǖśĭ1'm8:jǕŗǕUǕ

ƏǕǕ  Ǖ ǕǕ

Ǖ Ǖ ôjǕ XĮ1'm8ĻÃǕ Ǖ űƧǕ  Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ ƺǕ ƂǕ gǕ <Ǖ hǕ
Ǖ UǕ >Ǖ  h Ǖ ôǕǕ 5

%

Ǖ Ǖ HǕ u 7Ǖ 3Ǖ 55Ǖ

-<˕ ˕ -< ˕ "-(;Ň8P-Ǖ o-˕ %  ˕ % 2 ˕ ˕ <˕ -22˕ 22˕   ˕ ˕
˕ ˕p˕ -ʞĩ˕ < ˕% 2 ˕ ˕˕ ¥˕ -ȿ

2˕˕ - ˕-˕ 

¥ ˕ "-(;28(JǕ

o˕  < ˕  <˕   ˕ ] ˕2%˕˕ -˕  ˕ <2 ˕ 12˕  ˕ ˕ - ˕˕
˕ s˕ 2%˕ ˕]%˕ ˕ ˕ -˕- ²˕ "Å(;ň89-Ǖ o-˕ %Ÿ< ˕ %˕ ˕1-22˕22˕
 ˕<˕   2˕ 2Ȧ˕˕˕  ˕˕ i˕"-(;2PJķǕ  2 ˕˕   ˕:˕ ¤-<.˕
< ˕ -22˕ ˕  ˕ - -:<Õ˕  ˕ - < <2˕ -˕ % 2 ˕ ˕ <˕ ˕
 Ů-2˕ % < ˕ "į(;2P JǕ
*˕ -

˕  Ē˕ <ë ˕ -˕ ˕  ˕ ˕ ˕ .˕ t ˕ ˕ ì .˕ ë ɔ˕

˕ ʙ˕ =  -˕ 2 ˕ 2˕  ˕ ț˕ -˕ ˕  ʪ˕   2˕ - ˕ -2ȴz.˕ ˕ ȡ ˕
 Ÿ˕ ˕ -˕  ˕ K- ˕=:- ® 5 H˕ "-(;2PěP:JǕ o-˕ -˕ ˕ 2"˕ %  ˕ =ȉ  ˕
<˕ -

:< ˕-˕% 2 ˕˕ <-   ˕ ˕ù ʝ-2˕% < H˕"-(;2P:-Ǖ
o˕: - "˕K:-< ˕2˕ Ū ˕˕K- 2ɜ˕ K:-<-<˕˕Ȝ˕˕-˕K:˕

< ˕   ˕ o Ȣ Â˕ ˕ <-  .˕  ˕ ȑ2- Õ˕ ˕ 2˕ - Ɩ˕ -<˕ *ëz˕ 2 ˕
"-(;ŉR-Ǖ o˕

˕ < 22˕  ˕ 2-˕ < ˕ 2˕ ˕ 

--Ɨ˕  ˕ <˕

<-22˕ ˕-<ɫ˕  ˕ -˕ 5-2"Ƴ˕ "J(;2R-Ǖ
*U4Y:H:JUa N>a&:F:]4JUa NJTO:8[G4UD]:a 48UTa
JNUa_:UaDJaU@:aP:8NQ9a
ǟK 2

 ˕*-ː˕Ɍ:˕ o  ˑ˕g ˕
B˕ʆ-2˕ g ˀ˕-ĐĖȧ˕ȗ ˕ ˕ ˕ ˕K-Ŷ˕ ë--<˕ :˕˕ <˕

-<˕˃<˕˕< ˕ -˕%-²˕ Ý˕-Ƀ ˕ʫ˕-˕ -t˕ -

 ˕%˕ ˕

8Ů ˕ ˕o Ƌ˕ɚ<˕  ˕˕  ˕ ˕˕˕ ˕˕ ˕˕ ˕-˕

ló

ǕǕ
ǕǕ

ǕǕ.ǕA,Ǖ  Ǖ  Ǖ ³

ǕǕ §Ǖ ǕǕUǕIǕ

Ǖ t Ǖ.Ǖ Ǖ @Ǖ Ǖ Ǖt.Y Ǖ ǕǕ³ Ǖ Ǖ

Ǖ.Y  Ǖ ǕǕ¨ Ǖ Ǖ 7 ǕǕ  

Ǖ

ÄǕ"Æz{'ŊǕV VNø˕ Ǖ "yz9ǕŋǕD

8Ǖ¹Ǖ.Ǖ Ǖ   ǕǕ Ǖ ǕǕǕ ǕǕ .Y   yǕ  Ǖ
ǁ  Ǖ   Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ
  Ǖ

&ǕǕ¢Ǖ ǕǕ.@ Ǖ<ǕǕ7 ìǕ  

Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ

İǕ  yǕ

\ Ǖ  Ǖ 5Ǖ  Ǖ ƆǕ @Ǖ  Ǖ 

g @Ǖ Ǖ   Ǖ Ǖ t Ǖ

Ǖ   Ǖ <Ǖ Ǖ   Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ yǕ Ǖ nßǕ ǕI Ǖ  tǕ  wǕ  Ǖ Ǖ
^Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ 
 ìǕ ³Ǖ°Ǖ 

Ǖ IǕ  Ǖ 

 @ǕǕ/ ǕǕ^ Ǖ<

Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ

Ǖ

ǕǕ  ǕǕǕ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ

Mjó Ǖ U Ǖ ǕǕ¨Ǖ? ĆǕ. JǕVĈǕnŸ ǕǕI Ǖ wǕǕzÆǕ wǕ ǕǕ ^Ǖ
Ǖ Ǖ t&Ǖ Ǖ 

 Ǖ Ǖ /Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ

J$Ǖn Ǖ <Ǖ

I Ǖ  ǕǕ -Ǖ
I ǕÐ  VǕÒ  Ǖ
I  Ǖ   ,Ǖ " Ǖ  ǕǕ @Ǖ  Ǖ  Ǖ <^ Ǖ @ g ƠǕ Ǖ/
.  Ǖ Ǖ   ćǕ Đ/Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ I Ǖ Ǖ @Ǖ Ǖ

Ž

Ǖ Ǖ 7

Ǖ 



Ǖ

   Ǖ

 Ǖ   Ǖ Ǖ.   Ǖ Ǖ.ǕI VǕ Ǖ   $,Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ<Ǖ  ,Ǖ


 Ǖ Ǖ @

ǕǕǕǕ7 Ǖ

Ŝ  Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ OĜǕ A Ǖ    Ǖ 
Ǖ L

 Ǖ  ǕǕ. JǕn<^ ǕǕ

Ǖ Ǖ 75 Ǖ 

t Ǖ

 Ǖ  &Ǖ Ǖ

Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ ]Ƴ JǕ Ǖnß ǕǕ" Ǖ  ǕǕĝzǕ5 +^  ,Ǖ  Ǖ

%

5~ ˕˕ x EŴ˕ ˕ ˕ # ˕˕* ę ˕˕2˕x î˕ ˕5#˕

˕ ˕˕ ˕

¡~˕  ˕ )˕ #˕ #˕  ˕ >2˕ 1E¨ £M˕ ˕ ˕ x ó˕ ˕ ¡~ ʔ

 ˕  ˕

)  ˕˕ ˕ E Q˕ P ˕ #  ˕ ˕ #˕  ˕t ˕ 9˕ ˕ ˕ ˕ x ó˕˕
~ ˕ © ˕ #ŕ



˕ ˕ K Ȯ/ ˕ #m˕ #

þ˕

P?\I;JUa
x îî˕ # ˕ ˕ 1

 ˕ ˕ >9/˕ ˕9 Ő

Ƞ ˕ 1˕  9P˕   2¬˕ #>
)

1˕˕  ˕ x ¬˕ ]
©ş˕ P¡˕#˕ ˕

1˕ Ŭ

˕  ˕ K Ţ  ˕ # 

 9˕ >˕ ˕ ˕ 

˕ ˕   >˕ ˕ ¨#˕ R tʧM˕

˕ #˕  #/˕ 9˕  11 ¨˕ ˕ 1

˕ ˕ t#P˕   P˕ #> ˕ ˕

#2 ˕ ˕ 1 

# ˕ #;

9>˕ /99#Q˕ x ˕

2˕ §˕  ˕ x Ɔ˕  )ę˕ Š

˕  ˕  ˕

 ,˕ x ʿ˕ 

˕ ˕ §' ˕ K P  ˕

˕ K >ˈ ˕ ˕   ˕ ;˕§ï˕   2Ƈ˕#P

#˕1

Ŭ >˕ #˕  ˕

ɨ #

˕»9˕  Q˕ ^

 ˕ x ï¨˕ / ˕ 

#˕ ˕

  ˕ » ˕ # 

˕ ˕ 

˕

˕

 ˕˕1  ˕

5˕ ˕  11P / ˕  ˕

 ˕ t ˕

[ > ˕ &N^ ˕
â» ˕ Ⱦş˕  ˕  ¨˕ Ø1
  ŧ##˕˕   >˕ ˕ # Ő
ïP# ˕  ˕ ˕ 
˕   2˕¹˕ 9 

˕ ù1

29 ˕  ī˕ # »M˕ #˕ ě Ī˕ =  Ţ˕  11 ¨˕ ˕

9 nH˕cȀþ[þBɿŅ°fċÊQ˕ &N^Ú˕ xȤɼE˕;˕P ˕ ˕

# ˕ ˕ Ŵ˕ 

˕

P )˕ ˕ #

#˕  

˕ ˕

# ˕ äĚ˕#m9˕§˕ 1ę1 ʅm˕ɶɢ§˕§ ˕§ ¡n˕

x ó˕ ˕>˕˕˕   2¬˕1
˕ 1 9˕ ˕   >ƈ˕ 1

é

ȳʎ

˕˕ æ # ˕Ć ˕  ˕ ˕

˕ )˕ t P ˕ 

 ˕

˕ 1 #m9˕ 1  #2˕

é˕ ˕ ¨˕  ˕ >P  ˕  #˕ ˕˕  ˕   a˕ 0#2 ˕ Q''R'ÉǕ G#ó

xó



*Ǖ Ǖ   Ǖ !Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ Ǖƽ!ƭ6Ǖ xǕ 

Ǖ )Ǖ ) ïMǕ x!ǕǕ

FǕ !ƖǕ  uǕ )Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ æ Ǖ Ǖ  $Ǖ -*%2 Ǖ @˕ Ş Ǖ
F!gǕ !Ǖ *  

Ǖ Ǖ Ƶ_Ǖ !Ǖ 

*Ǖ  Ǖ

Ǖ  Ǖ * _ ǓǕ 0Ǖ )Ǖ 0 Ǖ  

Ǖ ïǕ

*)Ǖ!ǕǕ   Ǖ ÅǕSǕ Ǖ Ǖ*Ǖ Ǖ !* Ǖ  Ǖ !Ǖ 0 ǕǕ Ǝ! Ǖ Ǖ
UǕ Ǖ )Y Ǖ )6Ǖ Ǖ  Ǖ Ǖ Ǖ  MǕ  Ǖ Ǖ x)*Ǖ Ǖ à  Ǖ
!ƫ

Ǖ)Ǖ ! Ǖ )Ǖ !Ǖ*  üǕǕ*_Ǖ!Ǖ 

Ñ) Ǖ Ǖ7 Ǖ )Ǖè )xǕ ©Ǖ*Ǖ)g

Ǖ!Ǖ% ǕǕ ! ıǕ

Ǖ 

Ǖ  Ǖ) ǕǕö¬Ǖ

=B˕_ǕǕ ! Ǖ )0 Ǖ  ! Ǖ)Ǖ Ǖ _  ǕÑ)% Ǖ Ŧ ! Ǖ
ð* ǕFǕǕ~ )x ,Ǖ è ,Ǖ !!*©@Ǖ Ǖ ) Ǖ ) Ǖ  ƸǕ
!Ǖ FǕ  ! J$Ǖ 86[ó TǕĊċÊǠ,˕ąÊǲǜ,M˕ ĀƧĀn˕ ×Ǖ ƒ)xǕ Ǖ~ Ǖ Ʀ* Ǖ)Ǖ
! Ǖ!Ǖ Ǖ   Ǖ

_*Ǖ  Ǖ*  ¬ Ǖ )ǕƼǕƶ_Ǖ!Ǖ 

 ! Ǖ) Ǖ  uǕð Ǖ!Ǖ! Ǖ!Ǖ   Ǖ
Y §Ǖ !ǕǕ 

Ǖ!*Ǖ

Ǖ

ǕŝǕ
ǕqǕ!Ǖ

 Ǖ)Ǖ % Ǖ Ǖ%  Ǖ* ǕǕǏ Ǖ

ÔǕ Ǖ ^ ǕǕ?ŢľǕ % $Ǖ¹/ Ǖ)Ǖ)Ǖ  Ǖ ) Ǖ   $
Ǖ ºMǕ /!Ǖǀ Ǖ
! Ǖ0Ǖ ǕǕ  _ Ǖ Ǖ §

ǕǕǕƍ Ǖ!Ǖ

6Ǖ!ŵǕ @Ǖ 

Ǖ!Ǖ

!ǕǕ*Ǖ!ǕǕ0ƾǕ$Ǖ À6]ó TǕeØőÓǕDý˕ /AqǕ Ǖ )Ǖ%   Ǖ
7 ǕǕ ! Ǖ ǕǕ!Ǖ$ǕǕşŧǕT*_Ǖ!Ǖe 

Ǖ 8¹\ó[Q˕eØŒÓǕD&Q˕ S Ǖ!Ǖ

)6Ǖ  Ǖ )*Ǖ)Ǖ !Ǖ ) Ǖ!Ǖ6Ǖ)Ǖ ƣǕ)ǕǕ*6Ǖ 


Ǖ Ǖ0Ǖ! Ǖ !ǕǕ 7  ) Ǖ

%

!Ǖ Ǖ% ǊǕ

J˕ ˕T˕ 0˕  ƞ  0˕˕˕ ˕ ? ˕? ˕?"?è˕˕
Ď0T˕ʛ"˕?˕˕S˕˕S˕0 ˕0˕˕ě˕˕˕ų0˕ʄ ,˕^  ˕

˕˕

˕ " ˕˕˕0 ˕ ˕ 0˕S˕0Á˕?˕ " ˕˕˕0T˕0TM˕
0 ˕˕ ˕Ź S˕ ˕0Tİ˕ =ËJŎ ƟÙ  0˕˕˕  ˕˕0˕˕
ò ˕˕˕ʦ0˕0 ˕0˕T˕ SS˕˕0T¯H˕ ..2 :<

 1!*2&CZǇ˕ Âó

eɾ˕&FY.˕ź&b,˕ Ć0.˕ɧ ˕  ˕˕˕?˕˕¸T˕ ˕ ˕:5˕?˕
 ??"˕ "ʣ˕S˕S˕ "ı˕ =ŉ   S˕˕˕˕¹˕ ? ?ʟ˕" ˕
0˕U0˕ ˕ʥè˕?˕

˕ ˕?˕˕˕˕˕"T˕  ˕ ˕ Ś6?˕

? ˕ S˕S  iH˕ą""?˕Èə/˕ Ió l˕^.˕ŃǘáǢċȈǭ˕ Hó^ǞáǾÊá˕Êá˕9ºó

 b³C˕&CÛ³˕
J˕˕˕ 0?˕˕ ˕ S?>˕0T˕ Ĝ˕ ˕˕˕
0˕0"˕  ˕  ˕? ˕T˕ ˕ ˕˕Ď00,˕ 0˕ Źɮ÷˕ ¡è˕˕ ɐ"˕
ɺ?S˕ ˕ =ųT˕  ˕ ? 0S?0|˕ "?˕ Ȭ˕T˕ď˕"T˕˕ ?˕
ƨ˕ "T ˕ " ˕ ˕ ?S"˕˕ 0˕˕˕˕0 ˕?˕0>??˕ ˕
ô?">?ƅv.˕ S ˕˕ ?˕ 0 K˕ ˕˕ S .˕ 0˕è˕˕ 0˕ȭ˕ 

ñ˕˕

"S˕"˕ ÈěÃ˕ b³³Ʃ˕
..2 :<  "&$2 @ V&˕Ċ,& ˕N@@˕ŉ˕ āA!C˕ "˕S˕˕0   ˕˕˕

¤˕

0ˏ˕0ŷ"˕ ˕˕ ? ?"˕?˕˕÷˕?  ˕S˕ ˕0T˕S˕S˕S˕˕Ì0 ˕˕
˕˕ʹp ˕ j0˕˕  ˕ ˕ S  ˕˕ȣ 0"Ȟ˕ç0˕ Ĝ?˕˕ Ȳ˕
˕ò¯˕ J˕"˕ ˕  ˕"" ˕˕ " ˕˕˕š˕˕Í ˕

zó

} 

˕˕˕ ˕ }Ťť

˕ //#˕ ˕
˕Í

˕  5y˕ y˕ ˕1my

}/ i˕ â ˕c˕ ( 1

/ ˕R

ð˕

˕Ò

˕ #˕#

˕ ˕#~ɇ

m M˕ #


˕  ˕

Á #m˕  ˕

˕˕ ˕ / ˕

˕/ #˕˕ 

˕

ƫ˕p ˕ ( ˕ #˕#


˕ }; ˕

1˕ ]

˕s ˕

˕˕=˕H˕ ˕˕

  ˕ #˕˕  ƪ˕ Ča&AFk˕FNa˕ â ˕ ( ˕   ˕˕=#˕
˕

1m# ˕ =JsiH˕[a&A˕k˕F VN°˕BɎ

˕  ˕=˕

# ˕ ˕˕ 

1Q˕ [Q&+IF³i˕ ȁ ˕ ( ˕ s ˕ ˕

Ű˕ ˕ Ð  ˕

  ÐÐ˕ #˕ #

}

 ˕˕  ˕˕ ˕ 

˕#˕#Ťť ˕   P˕p

#  ˕ ( ˕ #˕#˕˕ 5˕  ˕ ˕

5

# H˕t .˕ ˕ 5#˕ĥĥ˕

}˕} ˕ // ˕ɋ/˕   ˕   m˕[Q&+IFN˕ â ˕ ˕ 

˕˕ 1˕ #˕HM˕ ˕ # ˕   m˕/

P˕

˕/ ˕˕

1 ˕˕˕ #˕  Ơ M˕;˕ ˕ ˕ Ț˕

#˕˕˕Í# ˕ ˕( ˕Š

  P˕˕11  ˕ ˕˕#  ˕



z˕) / Ű˕

˕ ˕  õ˕  # iH˕ "(%2 ˕N@AQ˕

¾   ˕ǗH˕[Q&+kNQ˕ ( Ɖ˕

 }˕#˕ ˕

˕˕

˕  ˕˕ /#˕ ˕

˕ ˕˕ ˕ #;˕ ˕# /

B˕Ò#P˕   ˕  ; m˕s ˕( ð˕  ˕ ˕ =

 ˕]

Ŏ˕#˕˕   M˕ ˕ 

ȓ˕ ˕ / ˕ / ˕ # ˕#~

Í  QH˕"(%2 @&˕ ǹ&˕N@@M N@Ai˕ ŋ E

/ ˕

#Ġ ˕ð˕ ˕= K m  ˕ #/˕

.˕ ˕˕1  ˕ ˕ Á˕˕˕Ë ˕#ŏ

1  ˕˕ Ȓ ˕# /

ĤĤ

˕˕#˕ ˕p /˕˕;˕#

5Ƭ˕ [i&A˕ǋ˕FFNQ˕ j ˕  ʘ˕ 

#˕  ˕= ˕1H˕  ˕1 

#iH˕[&+I˕Ĺ°˕ j ˕ 1 

˕ ˕ 

˕ï ˕

H˕˕

˕ #  ˕ ˕#˕#/ ˕
5˕ ˕ ˕1 E# ˕

 ˕ ˕}˕=

  ˕SǕ ˕˕

 ˕ ð ˕    ˕    ˕   m˕ ôôÐ5˕ u˕

Ð˕~˕;sm˕#˕Ń Q˕ ( ˕˕ m˕#/˕ K m˕˕ ˕ ˕˕ ö˕°H˕

%

3į&+!IZZY,˕ c""˕˕  0˕  

˕˕=˕"˕0;˕¶ģ:˕L;˕ ˕ " "˕

¾Ż,˕[n&+! <Z V@,˕ Bç ˕˕  ˕ ˕  "˕  ˕˕ ˕  ˕˕0

˕

~˕ ˕ " ˕˕* ¬˕ ˕˕ ( ,˕
^ ˕˕L˕ å ˕ ˕ ( ʻ˕˕ ˕˕˕ ¾˕ "
"8" ˕ B



 ˕˕˕˕

˕˕( ˕˕%  ˕˕ ˕˕"˕ ˕%0˕ĕ˕* ˕

"˕ĕ˕˕  "˕ 5˕ ˕ ˕˕ ˕˕ ˕˕˕ ˕%˕ 8"˕˕˕˕
˕""˕ ,˕ (˕Bå˕ ˕*  ˕( ˕˕&a˕ *˕æ ˕˕  08˕˕( LL˕
ɟū  ˕ * Ģ˕ ˕˕ ˕ ˕˕˕ " ˕ 0˕  " ˕˕,˕^ ˕˕
˕å L˕˕Ò9"˕  "˕ ˕ ˕˕  "˕5˕˕ ˕˕L˕ ˕ ˕˕
˕Ì  ˕( L˕˕ "˕ ˕ 8"n˕ (˕Bő˕˕ǽ 

˕ "˕ ˕ N°˕

* "˕ Ó"˕ 5;˕ ˕ ˕ /˕  ˕ ( E˕ ˕ 0˕  "˕5~˕
˕˕ ď˕ ū˕ ˕j z˕  



˕˕˕;˕˕˕L˕˕

 LU""˕;˕.˕  ˕˕˕%˕ ˕ ˕/.˕8 ˕˕ 0˕p˕/ ˕˕ ˕;˕
( ˕˕˕ġ00H˕˕ ˕ û˕ Bɍ ˕"M˕ ˕˕ /˕˕˕ ~˕¹˕p˕˕
ȩ˕Lɴ˕( ˕ ˕˕˕˕˕   ˕˕Ŕ  ˕˕ ;˕K0ţ˕ţ;˕  ˕
;˕   ˕ 8˕˕˕ 

,˕ j˕ ˕  ˕ ˕ 0˕ ˕ /˕ K£"˕ 

˕

Ó˕ ( L˕ ˕  Ì ˕KL¾:˕\˕ ď ˕ ˕8EE ˕˕˕ ˕˕ ˕˕˕˕
j ˕  ˕  ˕:.˕ :" .˕ ˕˕¥˕ ˕  ;˕˕ " ˕ Œ ˕˕:ɠ˕
˕ 8"˕ ˕ ˕ ˕ ˕1 ˕ ˕8,˕
*˕:˕ ˕ j ˕%˕˕ ˕8  ˕ ˕˕ ˕0 ˕L˕ ˕L˕

pcó

í˕ ˕ ˕ :˕  .˕ ; ˕˕%˕  :8"˕8  ˕˕ ˕h ȝ˕ hP ˕
Ȫɳh˕ ˕ h˕ ( z˕PhP˕˕ ʃ˕Ŗ:˕˕  ˕  ˕˕˕%˕ 

¯˕ *P˕

 Pz˕Ū ˕%˕  ¿˕8  ˕˕%˕ ¾8Pȫ˕ ˕˕ ˕˕íP˕˕
h  ˕ u˕ ˕ :˕ :T˕˕ í P˕˕˕  ˕ *˕ T˕K;˕ ˕
˕  "˕˕  z˕  ~ ˕ ˕  ˕ ˕   ˕˕"h ˕˕ ˕ ¾.˕
˕ğT˕ ˕˕ ɀ ˕ʍ  ˕
4<Q5DçÛ<>?ÇB=ó7K4A/AQ 8: 75Q (AQ (4#C(MQ74/OQ) Q(DQ ;8< 7 E(M0OQ
K6A740QK4:Q9;M)/)4$Q8:7!AA)740Q475AQ4QE7Q9:M*/Q74Q'(AQ/*2Q7CEQ2KAEQ
7N<73Q D&Q BI74$Q8:AK38E)74QE&EQ 7K4A/AQ 74LEQ2)$'EQ Q 74A+:QA7K4QE:)0Q
AJD$OQ 5DèÜ<>?ÈB=Oóó  QEQ {|`ó Ċ :8"T˕˕(˕;˕˕ ˕%  ˕ŭ˕˕

˕˕˕  h8"˕|˕ ˕1"T˕ ˕p˕íP˕˕ T.˕ ˕ %;˕˕
h  ˕ : ˕ ^ ˕˕˕˕ .˕ 8˕:˕˕T˕  ˕˕"˕ ˕ ˕ ˕
˕  "˕ ¦ ˕˕ :˕ .˕ ˕˕˕  h8˕˕˕   ˕˕5˕  ˕  ˕;˕
%˕ ˕  :˕ h  ˕˕j˕; ˕˕˕ ( î˕ T˕8˕˕5P;¯˕
Ŀ%h.˕¦˕Ò˕1 :1˕  ƃ˕ ȥ

˕%˕ ˕˕T˕

h :˕˕ ˕ ĕ ˕ 8  ˕˕˕ ˕ ˕  ;˕% ˕¿Ē˕ :T˕  : ˕
*˕ ˕8˕ ˕ :1.˕ 8 ˕˕˕  ˕  ˕p˕đ h.˕ ˕"˕  z˕
ʴT˕%˕˕1 ʓT˕ ˕ŝ˕%˕ ˕˕hɡ  Â˕ ˕˕˕1 ˕˕"Â˕
ğ˕ ˕˕ 6< 8] ˕˕ ˕hy ; ˕˕ğ˕|;˕˕ :ü˕j˕%˕ ˕
  ˕ 9˕ ɛ˕ ˕h˕1˕˕ ˕ :˕ 

oió

P˕h ; ˕˕ ˕ ˕ K P

 ¯˕

*˕Î$¢˕ $˕ ˕ 0 #2˕ Ï

  ˕ fÏ

 ˕˕ç$˕ ˕˕ ˕

$˕˕]Óu˕ ˕  ˕ |˕˕$| ˕ Jŗ$˕  ˕`˕Î$ ˕w˕ ¢ ˕  $˕
 ¢ ˕˕ $˕ $.˕  ˕˕ K `

˕˕ $ ˕˕ L ˕˕E˕

 $ w˕ L˕ $Ɂ $ ˕$˕  ˕   ˕˕$˕ $ $ ˕$˕˕5˕ ˕  ˕
˕˕L˕˕L˕  a˕ ( ˕ũ˕˕ ˕  ˕`$`|˕ $˕E˕]

 ˕

8  ˕p˕] ˕ K ˕˕ $ £˕8 ˕˕u˕ $˕˕`˕p˕E˕K Ó  ˕
 $ ˕ Ó` ˕ ˕ ˕ ˕y$ɂ $˕ê ˕$i˕B˕ 

 ˕ y$˕ñ˕Ɇ˕ $ĩ˕ ˕

Ï u˕ ˕  ¢ 5 ˕˕˕ $˕ ˕ ¢˕$¯˕ ȇ˕] u˕ `˕$˕˕
 $˕ ˕˕˕$˕ x ʤ˕ = 8$`|˕   d˕˕˕KLĘ˕$˕
Ò˕ $ ˕ 8 ˕$˕˕ $K˕ ˕˕$˕$˕ 8|˕˕] u.˕ ˕`˕˂˕˕L˕] ʗ˕
8` ˕ ( ʼ˕˕ $˕ $ ˕L ˕$Ŕ $ ˕˕K˕ $˕ EĘ ˕ņ˕¹˕
8 ˕ ê$˕ $ ˕p˕ ( ˕ ˕*ũ˕ ˕ ˕$˕u˕ ˕ Î$˕L˕ ˕ʽ$˕
˕L˕ w˕ $ ˕ $ ˕˕( ˕˕˕  $˕ ˕ ˕ Ŗ˕˕ ˕ ¶˕p˕] u˕
 ˕8$˕$ŧ ˕ E˕*˕$ ˕˕ ˕ ( ˕ ˕ ˕u˕  $˕ ˕˕˕
$˕ Ɋ˕ ˕ Ī˕ ˕  $˕ ɝ˕¢ |˕` ˕ ˕ ˕  ` 5 ˕] u˕ ` ˕ ˕8$˕
$˕ ˕ê$i˕ j`˕  $`z˕ ˕˕$LĘ
$Î $ ˕ Ýó ˕  ˕$ ˕Ȼ˕  ˕ê]

˕˕ $ ˕ ` ˕ $ éy$˕

 ˕ $˕˕ /+ #2

^  ˕ ( Ģ˕ u˕˕˕˕˕   ˕ $ ˕ $˕KEɵ˕
$`˕ L˕  $¢Ƅ˕ ˕˕ $ ˕ ʕ |˕˕ ˕ (z˕ |˕8] $˕
˕ Î $˕ é  ˕ ^  ˕˕ ˕  $v˕$$˕˕ ˕˕$|M˕ 8˕

%

˕ (L)˕8] L Ɣ˕  ˕˕˕  )8˕0)º ˕ ˕˕)"º˕ ˕¥˕ ˕ ) ˕˕
)Ř˕˕8]  ˕ )".˕ 8 ) ˕˕) ˕˕ ˕ )L˕   ˕ % ɭ ˕)˕8˕
ɖ}æ )˕ ºˋ˕%)˕˕ ] ¥˕   ˕)8 ˕˕ º˕˕  )˕º)$˕
 $ģ˕ æ  ˕ ]

  ˕ ( ó ˕

LAQE&QHE&QM,FAQAEQ 7?&Q474A8L0E)MQ!EAQ47EQ L>4E/PQ74QE&Q=7:Q
4QE7QAF0-A&QJ-0Q7L4A0AQ.4#E-MQ AA)AE4Q E&.AQ

7L?Q A&7L/Q$:4EQ 7HEAQ 37G)74Q

Q;34Q E&Q AQ "7:Q M)4E)Q &)4%AQ 4AA@Q E7Q AL99134EQ E&Q :7: Q

leȄl˕˕ V!©˕ )˕˕l /8 Ã˕ &CĀYý˕

l º˕ ˓*˕

%

 &,, a#aa
¶˕

8˕

ɒ˕E)˕¶˕:) ˕)˕ʵ ˕)˕ ¤

È  ș :Â˕ E : E÷˕ ˕ J 

˕ ˕ȱ˕ ˕\ ˕Èw˕

˕ E) ˕ 

)˕ ˕ E ˕ c˕ ʾ£ ˕

  \)PÕ˕ 1 )˕.˕ F@D˕ µE˕ NDD˕ ( E.˕ f,JÚ˕ ^K˕FGD!YGÖ˕ ()˕ß)5 ˕RE.˕
cEĒ˕GFFG®D!YG˕˕FE˕)˕˕ 

 M˕&DFY˕

só

lJcßBg˕ĉ,˕ jĿJǰ(JǱ˕F&@AC˕
.V4@a M[JZa$\aÍ¿Ñó

:<:J9:PTa TTM7a

˕Up˕c ˅˕ ,.˕ gU˕&C@˕
f .˕ c*˕!G@C˕

*>į˕!C,!&,FC+C˕
Bʑ˕ ˕B11>>)˕

+,ó 

   

gjB*ǝ˕J˕c*ļ.˕
$&#$#*
f>)˕ óB11>>Ã˕

#&

,˕

a

&a#&a(a

R)˕àI˕ &CFGCAAØR˕

ȆRŌ˕gRJjj.˕
l)˕óB11>>),˕

ǚ¹˕U1˕˕É˕ ˕B11>>)ø˕)˕  ˕˕ )U˕.˕ ·j˕·(˕
ǧ3µ^Ō˕J3lµ3µl˕)˕˕:) ˕˕:1 ) >˕ :)˕˕˕U Ų˕
lʶ˔˕RU ˕ ˕S)u˕) ˕)˕ ˕ ˕ ˕ ĐĖ<˕˕) ˕˕ ˕
>>˕ >):˕ ˕Ì ˕)) ˕˕  >k˕
Į˕ * )>˕ U>v˕)}>U ˕˕ 1 ˕˕ ˕ )¬˕) )˕ 8] ˕ U ˕
g ¬˕ :˕ ) ˕ )˕:)˕8˕˕)>>˕  :,˕
g˕  ˕˕



)˕˕

&C˕

,˕








^ȍ˕jĆµ˕ ąJc3oI˕

łU˕˕  ˕ň)˕ RU ˕ ˕B11)>˕

&ă˕

O,M!,(c %b c
 cłƦ˕ ! &  &

¾îØóäEAòó¬EÌàÚ;óÕAÏæóå;Zó
 & L\WcJ>],OR<[c

OL]Lc Áó


],c \=S,c &

&

  &

(L\6U\S'N('LIc
ZLQ,bRc.LOc NN,CDSc

¤ó)ó 7)ó /7¯ó/ó~22³ó

 c & c

£ Ä ó0ó
° Æó´0
ó

C>JS>/có MN,FC,,c
]Rc
R,cLc  &
%$& "&

,.,J(

Scó NM,DGSc

&%$& #& RSS,cS9,c.LHDL^<K6cLJcN,ORLJDcBJL_D,)6, c
& c 5< S9,c¸éÎó 'LTScX,c(,.,J(Sc=JcS9>Rc'$,c
 & & ,a,O'>R,(c Ibc O>7Sc SLcS,RS=2c LJcIbc L^Jc%,8D.c ScIbcY>Fc>JcV>Rc'R,c\O>J6c

Ibc S,RT@ILJbccY<,(c SLc S,RS>3c &L\Sc c"6\I,JSc S:Sc c :*c `>S9c,O-c c .,`c
(bRc %,.LO,c S9,c R9LLS>J6c ^:,P,cR:,cS9O,S,J,(cI,c :,cA\(6,cRSLNN,(cI,c1LIc
S,RS>4?J6c%L\ScS9Sc#6\I,JS c
 & .c c :(c %,,Jc DCL_,(c SLc S,RS>5c %L\Sc ñËó "6\I,KSc & _L\E(c ;],c S,RS<0,(c SLc

W,c.LDCL_>J6 c

%

k Fk ('H(O'ik "()IL(k W3(k O3IIS6F/k (L(Ok Éó % f(L(k L/b<F/k bL7F0k
]Sk L1g(ESk k O7'k QIk (L(Ok Sk ?(OSk k S

(k V+c ßCó :óÖó ó O\c-k

Ibk=bOSk@jk LIbF'k :ó OA((JkA?k Ȩİƀ˕
# k (L(Ok L(JA9('k U4Rk e36A(kjIbk fPk 0IF(k f8^k _(k #IiOk ć˕ @Jìó OA((Jk ć˕
f(FSk SIk S3(k

% LF0( k (Fk O3(k 3(@'k 3(Lk .G/(LOk ÔâÐó @êó k &7L&A(k

Id(Lk 3(Lk&3(OTkF'kO6'kFhó0ITk X4(Ck !% k2IbKk Kë×ÙCLó #9/ k
& k Fk S3(k &IFT(hSk ó`Uk L0bC(FTk k SII>k 3(Lk OSS(B(FSk SIk "(k k ]L(Sk V3Sk
O3(k fIbA'k ILk&IbA'k O3IISkC( k

ć˕ '(&?L(k bF'(Lk &L8D9FAkJ(FARik óV3Q WS(k ãÓó½ïó Y4SkZ4(k*IL(0I:H/k9Ok
ab(k!'k&IN(&S k

&}·&ó S59Ok

 'ik óik qdk!^ó


L&jk&I[[k

b%&L6$('k Êó OfIMk "(+IL(k C(k S3;Ok
&<*<
,! <<).<
 <
$%"1"(<-/<
0+< <  <
23<'<4<

 'jk I,k 

Pre !_ó

 
%











%

" %

©ó('ó» (ó -¼ó-ó 11' ¦±ó

"## .ó )#
!],NeDó jj<]]<<

%Ã*¶ó«ó
4*4%ó¨ó

y 
,y< h  "" Qó

µ®Å².áNó
<?<e9,ez ó kk<]],ez 

ó 3 3ó§ó yz,z<zL<@h_]hOeJhe j<oyhe,] [eh]<9J<
Vó Òó ,b,e ,hu<]N/<ey<9zh ko-//<],NezK< "z,z<h?)z,K 
Wó ó ,y n<z,Oe<9 zh o<jo<y<ez #o,7 "0h Ne , bo9<o /,y< K<o< K< ,y
,//y<9 h@ [N]]OeJ KNy X<#<o<y-  ó o<ko<y<ez<9 #o,8 Pe ko<k,o,zNhe?ho
N,^ ,z zqO,^ ,e9 ,z y<ez<e0OeJ <o y<ez<e/QeJ ó N}K9o< Hh zK<
2y<K<e 5ey<_ ,y ,jjhNez<9@ho ,kj<,_

tó #K< b,Oe h.Y<6O< -z zoN,_ -y zh yKh zK,z $o,0 ,y e9<o zK<






NeG<e/< h@ <}o<c< <dhzRhe,_ 9Oyzp<yy ,z zL< zNd< hAzK< yKhhzSeJ ,e9
zK,{ zK< 9Nyzo<yy ,y ehz y.y|-ezO-`_ 0,y<9 . %o,/y he /ie90z 
*< Khj<9 zh yKh zL,z &<o<y,y /ie96 /,y<9 #o,/ zh y?C<o ?ohd
,e <zo<b< <bhzNhe,] 9Oy}p<yy  +< k],ee<9 zh yKh #<o<y,y 4e9/z
Te/^9<9 K<o <y2],}NeJ }L< ]<<] hB |K<Oo EJKzOeJ , yk</NF/ zKo<-z
'<o<y, b,9< Ne zK< 9,y jo<1<9OeJ zK< yKhhzOeJ  ,e9 #<o<y-y
Ue}qh9/zVhe h? - Je Oezh zL< -_o<-9 z<ey< yOz,zQhe 0-y<9 (o,/y

%

<zr<b<<bhzNhf,]9Nyzr<yy 

Xó  f kr<k,r,zNhf @hr zrN,]  ykh\< NzK Nf:, "/h*,oo<f (s,/y bhzK<r 
*<9Ny/yy<; K<r lhyyN.]< z<ybhf,z N,]

Yó  2]]<: Nf9, *,rr<f ,y , Nzf<yy ,z zrN,]   Khk<: zh <y.]NyK zKrhJK
Nf9, zK,z yK< Nzf<yy<9 <N9<f/< yJJ<yzNfJ (t/ ,y =bhzNhf,]]
9Nyzr<yy<9  ]zKhJK ó ,y ,.]< zh Nfzsh9/< <N9<f/< r<],z<9 zh Nf9,y
h.y<x,hfy h@ (r,/ ,f9 &<s<y,y r<],zNhfyKNj ,f9 zM<Nr KNyzhr h@
EJKzNfJ zK< /hv </]9<9 <N9<g3 h@ zM< y.yz,f/< h@ , kKhf<
/hf<sy,zNhf .<<<f &r,/ ,f: Wg9, yKhw] .<@hr< zK< yMhhzOfJ  @
zK<Z9J< ,]]h<9 b< zh ,y\ Ng9, m<yzNhfy ,.hz zK,z /hf<ry,zNhf ó
<k</z K<rz<yzNbhfh]9 M,< .<<g zM,z
,  (s,/y,N9 zKNfJyNzK&<s<y, <s< hsy< zK,f zK<K,9 <<r.<<g
.  #s,/zh]9 K<r M< ,y y/,r<: h@ &<r<y, ,z yK< K,9 .><f ,/zNfJ
yzs,fJ< 
/  #r,/ zh]9 K<r K< K,9 y<<f , Jf bNyyWfJ@rhb zK< Jf y,@< ,f:
zK,zK< .<]N<<9#<r<y,M,9 zK<Jg NzK K<rNf zK<.<9 
9  #r,/ zh]9 K<r zK,z N@ ,fKNfJ .,9 K,kk<f<9 zK,z zK< .hy <r<
yklhy<9zh ]N<NzK Wg9,

wUó f kr<k,r,zNhf @hrzrN,] X ykh\<NzK(r,/"/h ,.hzK,zKNyz<yzNbhf
h_9.< 

yTó #r,/ <]</z<9 zh z<yzNI hf KNyhf .<K,a@ ,z KNy N,^ rNgJzK< 9Nr</z
<,bNf,zNhf  zrN<9 zh <]N/Nz z<y~Nbhg @shb (s,/ r<J,s9NgJ , zKr<,z
%

%D%LX <"%X NAX D WX /?X M,%X #WLX BD/ADX NAX N,%X L,AAM1?+ X ,%?X X L5%$X
E WX T,MX M-%X LB% /&0 LX A&X M.NX N,E%MX T%E%X N,%X 4O"+%X %V 6O"%$X M,%X
M%LM/=A?WX &XM.%X4O"+%X ,$X ;8AU%"X E WX MAX M%LM/*XMAXM,%X A?N%?MX A&XM,MX
N,D%NX&EA<X %D%LX ó %VB% MX,0LX M%LM1<A?WXTAO7$X ,S%X %%?X N,N X
X OD/?+X X )/+,MX X '%UX $WLX %&AD%X M,%X L,AAN1?+X %D%LX MA8#X E!WX
N-MXU,38%X .%X TLX +A?%X <B1?+X L,%X MAA5X ,%EX +O?XMAX M,%X L,AAM1?+X
E?+%X %F%LX MA6$X D WXM,MXL,%X ULX 9%X MAX +%NX 99X M,%X L,ANLX /?X X
CNM%E?X N,NX /+X ?$X L,%X .%8$X ,%EX .?$LX AS%EX ,%EX ,%KX(AD</?+X X
1E 8%XT1M,X ,%DX)/?+%JX
 X E WX /?N%EBD%M%"X %D%LLX LNM%>%?MX LX X N,E%N X %X N,AO+,NX L,%X
ULX LW1?+X L,%X ,$X X +P@X ?$X 5?%TX ,AUX MAX OL%X /NX +/?LMX ,1>X /&X
L-%X?%%$%$X NA X

ó "% 7E%X Q?"%EX D/=1?:X B%?8MWXA&XM,%X MM%X A'XN,XN,NXM,%X&AE%+A/?+X 0LX
NEO%X?$X AI% M X
XN,/LX

$WXA&XWX ma f Ró

RL E1%"X?$XLUAHX %&AG%X =%XM,2LX  "WX A&X

 

nbg Só

AMFWX O8/ X

   %

Addendum C – R.181-82: Jury Questions

·~

•

==~_:_==

.....

..

~-

J

0 0181

D – R.180: Trial Court’s Supplemental Instruction (Dynamite Instruction)

SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION
Members of the jury, I am going to ask you to continue your deliberations in an effort to
agree upon a verdict. I am specifically asking you to review all of the jury instructions I have
previously given you.
This trial represents a significant expenditure of time and effort by you, the court, the
parties, and their attorneys. If you should fail to agree upon a verdict, the case is left open and
may have to be tried again, and there is no reason to believe that the case can be tried again by
either side better or more exhaustively than it has been tried to you.
In order to bring eight minds to a unanimous result jurors should examine with candor the
questions submitted to them, with due regard and deference to the opinions of each other. All
jurors should consider whether their position is a reasonable one, when it makes no impression
on the minds of another equally honest, equally intelligent juror, who has heard the same
evidence, with an equal desire to arrive at the truth, under the sanction of the same oath.
Nevertheless, as I previously instructed you, it is your duty as jurors to consult with one
another and to deliberate, with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without
violence to your individual judgment. You each must decide the case for yourself, but should do
so only after a consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You should not hesitate to
change an opinion if convinced that it is erroneous. However, you should not surrender your
honest convictions concerning the effect or weight of evidence for the mere purpose of returning
a verdict or solely because of the opinion of the other jurors.
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